Governance matters by Kaufmann, Daniel et al.
Wpsalq?
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2196
Governance Miatters  Six  new aggregate measures
capturing various dimensions
of governance provide new
Daniel Kaufmann  evidence of a strong causal
Aart Kraay  relationship from better
























































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2196
Summary findings
In a cross-section of more than 150 countries,  paper by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobat6n,
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobat6n provide new  "Aggregating Governance Indicators," Policy Research
empirical evidence of a strong causal relationship from  Working Paper 2195), they then construct six aggregate
better governance to better development outcomes. They  indicators corresponding to six basic governance
base their analysis on a new database containing more  concepts: voice and accountability, political instability
than 300 governance indicators compiled from a variety  and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory
of sources. They provide a detailed description of each of  burden, rule of law, and graft. As measured by these
these indicators and sources. Using an unobserved  indicators, governance matters for development
components methodology (described in the companion  outcomes.
This paper  - a  joint  product  of  Macroeconomics  and  Growth,  Development  Research Group;  and  Governance,
Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute  -is  part of a larger effort in the Bank to study the causes and consequences
of governance for  development.  Copies of  the  paper  are  available free from  the World  Bank, 1818  H  Street NW,
Washington,  DC  20433.  Please contact  Diane Bouvet, room  G2-136,  telephone  202-473-5818,  fax 202-334-8350,
Internet  address dbouvet@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working  Papers are  also posted  on  the  Web  at  http://
www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at
dkaufmann@worldbank.org,  akraay@worldbank.org,  or pzoidolobaton@worldbank.org.  October  1999.  (60 pages)
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In recent years there has been a surge of interest in the consequences of
governance and misgovernance for development. This has been accompanied by a
proliferation  of data measuring subjective perceptions of various aspects of governance.
In this paper, we describe a new governance database containing over 300 such
governance measures compiled from a variety of sources. 1 We provide a detailed
description of each of these indicators and sources, and construct six aggregate
indicators corresponding to six fundamental governance concepts. We conclude with
new empirical evidence that governance matters, in the sense that there is a strong
causal relationship  from good governance  to better development outcomes such as
higher per capita incomes, lower infant mortality, and higher literacy.
In order to organize our data collection and dissemination efforts, we require a
working definition of governance itself. 2  We define governance broadly as the traditions
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the
process by which governments,  are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of
the govemment to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions among them.
The focus of our data collection effort is a set of indicators which measure
subjective perceptions regarding the quality of governance in different countries. Our
data are drawn from two types of sources: polls of experts, which reflect country ratings
produced by commercial risk rating agencies and other organizations, and cross-country
surveys of residents carried out by international organizations  and other non-
governmental organizations. We do not attempt to compile or present the wide array of
available quantitative and descriptive data on cross-country differences in political and
social institutions. 3 While these are certainly important determinants of the cross-
IPending  appropriate  authorization  from  original  sources,  we  plan  to  have  the  database  itself  ready  for
dissemination  on the Web  late in 1999.
2There  does  not  appear  to  be  a single  accepted  definition  of  govemance.  Our-definition  of  govemance  is  in
part  motivated  those  suggested  by  the  Institute  for  Governance,  IDEA,  and  the  IMF.
3A  database  of  such  objective  institutional  indicators  is currently  being  compiled  as  a joint  effort  by  Phil
Keefer  (World  Bank),  Robert  Bates  (Harvard  University),  and  David  Epstein  and  Sharyn  O'Halloran
1country differences in the quality of governance, our focus here is limited to measuring
the perceptions of interested parties -- residents of a country, entrepreneurs, foreign
investors, and civil society at large -- regarding  the quality of govemance in a country.
Although this kind of data is inherently subjective, there are several reasons why it is
useful in measuring governance. First, for many issues such as the prevalence of
corruption, objective data is almost by definition rather difficult to obtain. There are few
alternatives  to subjective indicators if one wishes to measure these aspects of
govemance. Second, perceptions of the quality of governance may often be as
important as objective differences in institutions across countries. While a country may
nominally enjoy a set of sound institutions according to certain standards, the confidence
of residents of a country in these institutions is also required if they are to contribute to
good govemance. Third, we have found in other work that subjective perceptions can
have significant explanatory power for future economic outcomes. 4
We use our definition of govemance to organize a subset of the govemance
indicators into six clusters. We summarize two key aspects of the process by which
those in authority are selected and replaced  with clusters labelled "Voice and
Accountability", and  "Political Instability and Violence". We capture the capacity of the
state to implement sound policies with two clusters we refer to as  "Government
Effectiveness"  and 'Regulatory  Burden". Finally, two clusters labelled "Rule of Law" and
"Graft" capture the respect of citizens and the state for the rules which govem their
interactions.  For each of these six clusters, we use the procedure laid out in Kaufmann,
Kraay and Zoido-Lobat6n (1999) to construct aggregate governance indicators. The
advantage of these aggregate indicators is that they span a much larger set of countries
than most individual indicators, permitting  cross-country comparisons of between 155
and 173 countries, depending on the aggregate. More important, the aggregation
method we use provides quantitative measures of the precision of both the aggregate
governance indicators and their components, allowing formal statistical testing of
hypotheses regarding cross-country differences in govemance along these dimensions.
(Stanford  University),  in an effort  coordinated  by  the Center  for Intemational  Development  at Harvard
University.
In the context of the East Asian financial crisis, Kaufmann, Mehrez and Schmukler (1999) find that investor
perceptions of future financial instability had significant explanatory power for future actual volatility, over
and above available macroeconomic  data.
2There is a growing empirical literature documenting the relationship between
indicators of various aspects of governance and economic outcomes.5 Using the six
aggregate governance indicators described above, we contribute to this literature by
providing new empirical evidence of a strong causal relationship  from improved
governance to better development outcomes. Following the approach of Hall and Jones
(1999), we estimate a series of very parsimonious  regressions of the log-level of per
capita income on each of the six aggregate governance indicators in turn. We correct for
reverse causation, omitted variable bias, and measurement  error in the governance
variables, by using the shares of the population speaking European languages as
instruments. We find that govemance matters a great deal for economic outcomes.  In
particular, a one-standard deviation increase in any one of our governance indicators
causes between a two-and-a-half and four-fold increase (decrease) in per capita
incomes (infant mortality), and a 15 to 25 percent increase in literacy. Tests of
overidentifying restrictions and summary statistics of the explanatory power of the first-
stage regressions provide support for the validity of this modelling strategy.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes the
governance database, with the details of each source of data and each governance
measure relegated to a lengthy Appendix 1.  Section 3 summarizes the components of
each of the six govemance aggregates and explains the aggregation procedure. The
details of the composition of each aggregate are presented in a series of tables in
Appendix 2.  Section 4 contains new empirical evidence on the relationship between
governance and development outcomes.
This  literature  includes  Mauro  (1995)  on the effects  of corruption  on economic  growth  and  investment;
Loayza  (1996)  on the determinants  of the unofficial  economy;  Ades  and  DiTella  (1996)  on the causes  and
consequences  of corruption;  Knack  and  Keefer  (1997)  on the importance  of institutions  for economic  growth;
Tanzi  and Davoodi  (1997)  on corruption  and  public  investment;  Wei  (1997)  on the effects  of corruption  on
FDI; Rodrik  (1997)  on the role  of instiitutions  in the success  of East  Asia ; Johnson,  Kaufmann  and  Zoido-
Lobat6n  (1998)  on the effects  of corruption  on the unofficial  economy;  Hall  and  Jones  (1999),  on the
relationship  between  levels  of per  capita  income  and  a measure  of  what  they call 'social infrastructure",  and
Chong  and  Calder6n  (1999)  on the Granger-causality  between  institutions  and  economic  growth.
32.  The Governance  Database
We have  compiled  a large  number  of governance  measures  from a variety  of
sources  into  a governance  database.  These  different  sources  produce  indicators  of a
wide  range  of concepts  relating  to govemance,  using  different  techniques,  and covering
different  sets of countries. Table 1 presents  the sources  of governance  data  included  in
the database.  These  include  intemational  organizations,  political  and business  risk
rating  agencies,  think  tanks,  and non-governmental  organizations. In this section,  we
provide  an overview  of some  of the key  features  of these  sources. Appendix  1 presents
a detailed  description  of each  of these  sources.
We classify  sources  of governance  data  along  two dimensions:  (1) according  to
their  unatureW,  i.e. the techniques  they employ  to measure  governance;  and (2) according
to their  "coverage",  i.e. the extent  to which  the set of countries  covered  by each  indicator
is representative  of the world  as a whole.
With respect  to their  "nature",  sources  are  either  polls  of experts  or cross-country
surveys  of firm managers  or citizens  in general. Measures  based  on polls  of experts
represent  consensus  ratings  agreed  upon  by a small  number  of country,  sector,  and
regional  experts  convened  by  the reporting  organization.  Typically,  country  analysts
produce  an initial  assessment  for each  country  based  on publicly-available  information
and  their  direct  knowledge  of the country. For most  of the sources  we report,  these
assessments  are guided  by a checklist  of specific  issues  which  analysts  take into
consideration  when  providing  their initial  ratings. For all sources  where  we were able  to
obtain  this information,  we report  the checklists  underlying  the ratings. These  initial
ratings  are  then  reviewed  by a panel  of regional  and  sectoral  experts,  who determine  the
final rating  for each country. In addition  to providing  quality  control  on  the initial
assessments,  the purpose  of this final stage  is to improve  the cross-country
comparability  of the ratings  by ensuring  that countries  are  benchmarked  appropriately.
Indicators  based  on surveys  present  averages  by country  of the responses  of a
large  number  of respondents  to a variety  of questions  relating  to governance.  Typically,
survey  respondents  are asked  to rate aspects  of governance  on a categorical  scale.  The
sampling  frame  of the surveys  we use  varies. Some  sources  focus  on the opinions  of
4the business community, others focus on the opinions of expatriates, and some are
broad-based surveys of citizens.
The two types of sources of governance data each have their advantages and
disadvantages. The main advantage of polls of experts is that they are explicitly
designed for cross-country comiparability,  and considerable effort is placed in the
benchmarking process which ensures this.  However, the difficulties with such measures
are also clear. Typically they are based on the opinions of only a few experts per
country, and the quality of the country ratings depends to a great extent on the
knowledge of experts regarding  the countries they are assessing. The ratings are
particularly  prone to two types of feedback:  countries with good economic outcomes
may be more likely to receive favourable ratings, and country rankings by other
organizations are frequently an input into the rating process of each organization.
Country ratings may also be affected by the political or ideological agenda of the
organization producing the ratings. Despite these difficulties,  we believe that there are
at least two reasons to think that on average, such sources provide valuable information
on governance.  First, we find that the indicators produced by such organizations
generally correlate strongly with measures based on surveys of residents and
entrepreneurs. Second, we find the fact that commercial rating organizations such as
EIU, DRI and PRS are able to consistently sell their assessments  to commercial
subscribers  for considerable feies  to be convincing evidence that these sources are in
fact producing useful information. 6
The advantage of surveys is that they reflect the opinions of a larger number of
respondents that are more cloisely  connected with the countries they are assessing.
Nevertheless,  they suffer from two disadvantages. First, survey questions can be
interpreted in context- or culture-specific  ways.  For example, a response regarding the
prevalence of "improper practices" is coloured by country-specific perceptions of what
uimproper practices" are perceived to be.  This will hinder the cross-country
comparability of responses to otherwise identical questions. 7 Second, cross-country
6 For example,  as of May  1999  an annual  subscription  to EIU's  Country  Risk  Service  costs  $625  US  per
year,  an annual  subscription  to PRS's  Intemational  Country  Risk  Guide  on CD-ROM  costs  $4500  US per
year.
7  A related  problem  is that residents  of particular  countries  may  have  a broad-based  predisposition  to over-
state  or understate  governance  problems  in that country  (see Kaufmann  and  Zoido-Lobat6n  (1999)  and
Kaufmann  and  Wei  (1999)).
5surveys  relating  to governance  are  very  costly  to design  and implement,  and as a result
typically  cover  a much  smaller  set of countries  than  polls  of experts.
Sources  of governance  data  also  vary  with  respect  to the sample  of countries
they cover.  A number  of sources  cover  a very  large  sample  of developed  and developing
countries  (EIU,  DRI,  HFWSJ,  PRS  and  WDR),  while  others  cover  very  narrowly-focused
samples  of countries  (PERC  for Asia,  CEER  and FHNT  for transition  economies).  Some
sources  cover  primarily  developed  countries  but also include  major  developing  countries
(WCR,  GALLUP,  BERI). Since  there  is a strong  positive  association  across  countries
between  governance  and per  capita  incomes,  this difference  between  sources  makes  it
difficult  to compare  indicators  from sources  which  cover  sets of countries  with  very
different  income  levels. Similarly,  there  may be  regional  differences  in govemance
which  hamper  comparisons  across  sources.  For example,  it is not clear  how to compare
a governance  rating  based  only  on transition  economies  with  one based  on a broad  set
of countries.  As discussed  in our  companion  paper  (Kaufmann,  Kraay  and Zoido-
Lobat6n  (1999)),  the methodology  we use  to construct  aggregate  govemance  indicators
takes  these  differences  in country  coverage  into  account. Users  of the govemance
database  are  also encouraged  to keep  this consideration  in mind  when  comparing
information  from different  sources.
In order  to distinguish  between  indicators  according  to the representativeness  of
their  country  coverage,  we construct  a simple  index  which  measures  differences
between  the distribution  of countries  across  income  and regional  classifications  and the
corresponding  distribution  of all countries  in the world. In particular,  we divide  the world
into  a two-way  classification  by region  and income,  following  the World  Bank's  1998
World  Development  Report. For  each of the sources  of govemance  data,  we report  one-
half  of the sum  of absolute  values  of the deviations  between  the share  of countries  in
each of the  45 categories  (five  income  categories  x nine  regions)  in that source  and in
the world  as a whole. By construction,  this measure  ranges  from zero  to one,  with  low
values  indicating  more  representative  indicators.  We report  this number  in the fifth
column  of Table 1. The  six indicators  covering  the largest  number  of countries  (DRI,  EIU,
FH, HFWSJ,  PRS  and  WDR)  are  substantially  more  representative  according  to this
measure  than  the others,  with a value  of this index  of less  than  0.25. We refer  to these
as representative  indicators,  and  the remainder  as non-representative  indicators.
63.  Aggregate Governance Inidicators
In this section, we organize a subset of the govemance indicators into six clusters
corresponding  to six basic aspects of governance, and describe how these indicators
can be combined into aggregate governance indicators. In Appendix 2, we present six
tables which identify the specific components of each governance cluster with reference
to the tables describing sources in Appendix 1. The aggregate governance indicators
described here are based on data for 1997 and 1998.8 We stress at the outset that the
classification  of indicators into clusters is not intended  to be definitive. Rather, it reflects
our own views of what constitutes a useful and interesting organization of the data that is
consistent with prevailing notions of governance. 9
Governance Clusters
The first two governance clusters are intended  to capture the first part of our
definition of governance: the process by which those in authority and selected and
replaced. We refer to the first of these as "Voice and Accountability", and include in it a
number of  indicators measuring  various aspects of the political process, civil liberties
and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country
are able to participate in the selection of governments. We also include in this category
three indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important
role in holding monitoring  those in authority and holding them accountable for their
actions.
The second governance cluster is labelled "Political Instability and Violence".  In
this index we combine several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood
that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly
unconstitutional  and/or violent means. This index captures  the idea that the quality of
governance in a country is ccmpromised by the likelihood of wrenching changes in
8As we expand  the govemance  database,  we hope  to  construct  comparable  aggregates  for other  time
periods,  enabling  comparisons  over  time  as  well  as across  countries.
9Users  of  the govemance  database  may  question  both  the classification  of individual  indicators  into  these
six  clusters,  and also  the six  categories  themselves.  Users  are  therefore  welcomed  to use individual
indicators  and  construct  aggregate  indicators  that  are most  useful  to their  own  analytic  purposes
7govemment,  which  not only has  a direct  effect  on  the continuity  of policies,  but also at a
deeper  level  undermines  the ability  of all citiz,ens  to peacefully  select  and replace  those
in power.
The next  two clusters  summarize  various  indicators  of the ability  of the
government  to formulate  and implement  sound  policies. In UGovemment  Effectiveness"
we combine  perceptions  of the quality  of public  service  provision,  the quality  of the
bureaucracy,  the competence  of civil servants,  the independence  of the civil service  from
political  pressures,  and the credibility  of the govemment's  commitment  to policies  into  a
single  grouping. The main  focus  of this index  is on uinputs"  required  for the govemment
to be able  to produce  and implement  good  policies.  The second  cluster,  which  we refer
to as "regulatory  burden",  is more  focused  on  the policies  themselves.  It includes
measures  of the incidence  of market-unfriendly  policies  such  as price  controls  or
inadequate  bank  supervision,  as well  as perceptions  of the burdens  imposed  by
excessive  regulation  in areas  such  as foreign  trade  and business  development.
The last  two clusters  summarize  in broad  terms  the respect  of citizens  and  the
state  for the institutions  which  govem  their interactions.  In "rule  of law"  we include
several  indicators  which  measure  the extent  to which  agents  have  confidence  in and
abide  by the rules  of society. These  include  perceptions  of the incidence  of both  violent
and non-violent  crime,  the effectiveness  and predictability  of the judiciary,  and the
enforceability  of contracts.  Together,  these  indicators  measure  the success  of a society
in developing  an environment  in which  fair and predictable  rules  form the basis  for
economic  and social  interactions. The final  cluster,  which  we refer  to as ugraft",
measures  perceptions  of corruption.  Unlike  all of the other  clusters,  this one can  be
easily  described  using  the conventional  definition  of corruption:  the exercise  of public
power  for private  gain. Despite  this  straighfforward  focus,  the particular  aspect  of
corruption  measured  by the various  sources  differs  somewhat,  ranging  from the
frequency  of "additional  payments  to get things  done"  to the effects  of corruption  on  the
business  environment.  The presence  of corruption  is often  a manifestation  of a lack  of
respect  of both  the corrupter  (typically  a private  citizen)  and the corrupted  (typically  a
public  official)  for the rules  which  govem  their  interactions,  and hence  represents  a
failure  of governance  according  to our  definition.
8Aggregating  Governance  Indicators
Implicit  in our organization  of the data  is the view  that,  within  each cluster,  each
of these  indicators  measures  a similar  underlying  basic  concept  of govemance.  Given
this view,  there  are considerable  benefits  from combining  these  related  indicators  into  an
aggregate  governance  indicator  for each  cluster. First,  the aggregate  indicators  span  a
much  larger  set of countries  than any  individual  source,  permitting  comparisons  of
governance  across  a broader  set of countries  than  would  be possible  using  any  single
source. Second,  aggregate  indicators  can provide  more  precise  measures  of
governance  than individual  indicators.  Third,  it is possible  to construct  quantitative
measures  of the precision  of both  the aggregate  governance  estimates  for each country,
as well as their  components.  This allows  formal  testing  of hypotheses  regarding  cross-
country  differences  in governance.
For  each of these  clusters,  we combine  the component  indicators  into an
aggregate  govemance  indicator  using  the method  described  in Kaufmann,  Kraay  and
Zoido-Lobat6n  (1999). We use  an unobserved  components  model  which  expresses  the
observed  data  in each  cluster  as a linear  function  of the unobserved  common
component  of govemance,  plus  a disturbance  term capturing  perception  errors  and/or
sampling  variation  in each  indicator.'( This  model  enables  us  to compute  estimates  of
each  of the six governance  measures  for each  country,  as well  as measures  of the
precision  of these  estimates.  Formally,  the estimate  of governance  for a country
produced  by the unobserved  components  model  is the mean  of the distribution  of
unobserved  governance  conclitional  on the observed  data  for that country. This
conditional mean is simply a wNeighted  average of appropriately-rescaled  scores of each
of the component  indicators.  We also report  the standard  deviation  of this conditional
distribution  as an indicator  of the confidence  we can have  in this estimate. This  standard
deviation  is declining  in the number  of individual  indicators  in which  a particular  country
appears,  and is increasing  in the variance  of the disturbance  term on each of these
indicators. Our  choice  of units  for governance  ensures  that the estimates  of governance
have  a mean  of zero, a standard  deviation  of one,  and range  from around  -2.5 to around
10  If there  are  multiple  questions  on a single  source  which  belong  in a particular  cluster,  we  first average,
questions  from the  same  source,  and  treat  the average  as  a single  indicator  based  on that source.  We do
this because  the necessary  assumption  that  the errors  on indicators  are independent  across  indicators  is
much  less  tenable  in the case  of multiple  questions  from  the same  source.
92.5.11 We orient  these  aggregate  indicators  such  that higher  values  correspond  to better
outcomes.
The  assumptions  of the unobserved  components  model  ensure  that the
distribution  of govemance  in each  country  is normal,  conditional  on  the data  for that
country. Therefore,  these  conditional  means  and standard  deviations  for each country
have  a natural  interpretation.  For example,  a useful  interpretation  of the reported
estimates  and standard  deviations  for each  country  is to note  that there  is a 90%
probability  that the "true"  level  of govemance  in a country  is in an interval  of plus  or
minus 1.64  times  the reported  standard  deviation  centered  on the point  estimate  itself.
We refer  to such  a range  as a 90%  confidence  interval  around  the estimate  of
govemance  for a country.  12  Similarly,  since  the assumptions  of the model  ensure  that
the distribution  of govemance  conditional  on the observed  data is independent  across
countries,  it is possible  to make  probabilistic  statements  comparing  govemance  in pairs
of countries. For example,  it is straightforward  to compute  the probability  that
govemance  in one country  j is better  than in another  country  j' by evaluating  the
appropriate  cumulative  bivariate  normal  distribution.
As emphasized  in our  paper  on aggregating  govemance  indicators,  we  find that
the underlying  governance  concepts  in each  cluster  are  not very  precisely  estimated,  in
the sense  that the measured  standard  deviations  are large  relative  to the units  in which
governance  is measured.  We illustrate  this point  in Figure  1. In each  of the six panels,
we order  countries  in ascending  order  according  to their  point  estimates  of govemance
on the horizontal  axis,  and on  the vertical  axis  we plot  the estimate  of governance  and
the associated  90%  confidence  interval  described  above. The size of these  confidence
intervals  varies  across  countries,  as different  countries  appear  in different  numbers  of
sources  with different  variances.  The resulting  confidence  intervals  are large  relative  to
the units  in which  governance  is measured.  To emphasize  this key point,  the horizontal
lines  in Figure  1 delineate  the quartiles  of the distribution  of govemance  estimates.
Relatively  few countries  have  90% confidence  intervals  that lie entirely  within  a given
I Underlying  the  model  is  the  assumption  that  the  distribution  of  govemance  is normal  with  zero  mean  and
unit  standard  deviation.  The  distribution  of the  actual  estimates  of goveMance  is very  similar.
12This is a slight  abuse  of terminology,  as  these  are  not  confidence  intervals  in the usual  frequentist  sense
of  a stochastically  varying  interval  centered  around  a fixed unknown  parameter.  Rather,  we treat
govemance  as a random  variable,  and  the 90%  confidence  interval  is simply  the 5F  and  95t percentiles  of
the conditional  distribution  of  goveMance  given  the observed  data.
10quartile. This indicates  that sorting countries into even broad categories is subject to
significant margins of error for most countries,.
The rather large size of these confidence  intervals has important implications for
the use of these aggregate governance indicators. It is clear that small differences in
point estimates of governance across countries are not likely to be statistically
significant. This mirrors the reality that it is in fact difficult to distinguish small differences
among countries using this type of data on govemance. As a result, users of this data
should focus on the range of possible governance  for each country as summarized in
the 90% confidence intervals shown in Figure 1.  For two countries at opposite ends of
the scale of govemance, whose 90% confidence  intervals do not overlap, it is
reasonable  to conclude that there are in fact significant differences in govemance
between these two countries.  For pairs of countries that are closer together and whose
90% confidence intervals overlap, one should be much more circumspect about the
significance of estimated differences in govemance between two such countries.
Despite the imprecision of these aggregate indicators, they are still very useful,
for several reasons.  First, since each of these aggregate indicators spans a much larger
set of countries than any individual indicator, it is possible to make comparisons  -
however imprecise -- across a  much larger set of countries than would be possible with
any single indicator. Second, although imprecise, each aggregate indicator provides a
more precise signal of its corresponding broader governance concept than do any of its
component indicators, and moreover provides a convenient and consistent summary  of
the available evidence. Third, the measures of precision for each country are useful
because they enable formal statistical tests of cross-country differences in governance
instead of arbitrary comparisons.  Fourth, it is possible to use information in the
estimates of the precision of each aggregate  to quantify the effect of measurement  error
in regression analyses that use governance indicators as right-hand side variables.
114. Governance Mafters
How much does govemance matter for development outcomes? In Figures 2-4,
we document  the strong positive association between each of the six aggregate
governance indicators and three development outcomes: per capita incomes, infant
mortality, and adult literacy. However,  these simple correlations cannot be interpreted
as evidence of a causal relationship  from better governance to better development
outcomes, since they do not control for other determinants of development, and may
also reflect a reverse causation from development  to governance. In this section, we
disentangle the direct effects of governance on development outcomes by instrumenting
for govemance in a series of cross-sectional  regressions of these outcomes on each of
our six governance aggregates. We find that improvements in govemance have a very
large payoff in terms of development outcomes.
Our approach is motivated by Hall and Jones (1999), who argue that the key
determinant of cross-country differences in output per worker is differences in what they
call "social infrastructure', and which can be broadly interpreted as some combination of
the aspects of governance we discuss above. They measure social infrastructure as a
simple average of a number of governance indicators from PRS and a variable
measuring trade openness constructed by Sachs and Wamer (1995). We extend the
these results by considering a wider range of govemance indicators and development
outcomes in a larger sample of countries.
Empirical Specification
To simplify the discussion, we present the empirical specification using the
logarithm of per capita GDP as the dependent variable.  When we tum to the results, we
will consider the identical specifications  for the two other development indicators: infant
mortality and adult literacy. We follow Hall and Jones (1999) in writing an extremely
parsimonious specification in which the logarithm of per capita income, yj, is a linear
function of govemance, gj,  and an error term ej:
(1)  y1 =a+03*g  +e1
12The error  term reflects  both  mieasurement  error  in per  capita  incomes  as well as all other
determinants  of cross-country  differences  in per  capita  incomes  that have  been  excluded
from this  simple  specification.  To the extent  that these  are correlated  with  govemance,
this  will introduce  omitted  variables  bias  in simple  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)
estimates  of Equation  (1).
Governance  itself  is not randomly  distributed  across  countries. Good
govemance  requires  time  and resources  to develop,  suggesting  that richer  countries  are
more  likely  to enjoy  good  govemance.  Govemance  also  depends  on a country's  political
and social  history,  especially  in those  countries  that inherited  a set of institutions  from
the former  colonial  powers. B3ased  on  this motivation  we write  governance  as a function
per  capita  income  yj, as well as a set of additional  observable  determinants  N:
(2)  gj =  +8*yj  +  'xj +vj
where  v}  is a zero-mean  error  term capturing  other  unobserved  determinants  of
governance.  Depending  on  the sign  of the  feedback  from income  to govemance,  simple
OLS estimates  of (1)  will be biased  upwards  or downwards.
Finally,  we have  already  observed  that govemance  itself is not very  precisely
measured.  In particular,  our observed  govemance  aggregates,  gj*,  provide  a noisy
signal  of "true"  governance:
(3)  gj* =g  + uj
where  u 1is a zero-mean  disturbance  term reflecting  measurement  error. This  will
introduce  a downward  bias  in regressions  using  observed  governance  as the
explanatory  variable.
Substituting  Equation  (3) into  Equation  (1) yields  our empirical  specification,  in
which  we regress  the log-level  of per  capita  income,  yj, on observed  govemance,  gj*:
13(4)  Yi =a+P-gi  *+(e,-P-U,)
We identify  the model  with  the assumption  is that the observable  determinants  of
governance  included  in  x;  are uncorrelated  with  the composite  error  term in Equation  (4).
In particular,  these  determinants  of govemance  must  be uncorrelated  with both  the other
determinants  of income  excluded  from our  simple  specification  (captured  by ej),  and  with
the measurement  error  in governance  (captured  by uj),  i.e. E[x 1 *  e, ] = 0 and
E[x,  u;] = O.  Under  this assumption,  the elements  of x 1are  valid  instruments  for
measured  governance  gj* in Equation  (4). Given  such  instruments,  we can  address  the
problems  of omitted  variables  bias,  simultaneity  bias,  and attenuation  bias  using  two-
stage  least  squares  (2SLS).
We follow  Hall  and Jones  (1999)  in using  the  fraction  of the population  speaking
English,  and the fraction  of the population  speaking  a major  European  language
(English,  French,  German,  Portuguese  or Spanish)  as instruments. As Hall and  Jones
(1999)  argue,  a major  feature  of world  history  in the past  several  centuries  has  been  the
spread  of Western  European  influence  across  countries.  Together  with  this influence
came  an institutional  and cultural  background  that in certain  countries  was conducive  to
the development  of strong  institutions  and  good  govemance.  Since  the extent  of this
influence  varies  widely  across  countries  and may  safely  be  thought  of as exogenous  to
economic  outcomes  centuries  later,  proxies  for this influence  such  as  the linguistic
variables  are good  candidates  for instruments. 13
Data
Our data  are drawn  from readily-available  sources.  The  six governance
indicators  have  already  been  discussed  in the previous  sections,  and refer  to the period
1997-98. We measure  per  capita  income  as the average  over  all available  years
13  Hall  and  Jones  (1999)  also  use  distance  from  the  equator  as  a proxy  for  the  strength  of  past  Westem
European  influences.  We  found  this  not  to  be  a good  instrument  in  our  regressions  as  we  could  not  reject
the null  hypothesis  that  it has  a direct  influence  on  per  capita  incomes  in  addition  to  its  indirect  effect  through
governance.  Only  if we  combine  our  direct  measures  of govemance  with  other  measures  of policy  (such  as
the  Sachs-Wamer  index  used  by  Hall  and  Jones  (1999))  does  an  instrument  set  including  distance  from  the
equator  pass  tests  of  overidentifying  restrictions.  Similarly,  in  the  Hall  and  Jones  (1999)  specificaton,  tests
of  overidentifying  restrictions  fail  if  the  policy  variable  is excluded  from  their  measure  of  social  infrastructure.
14between  1990  and 1995  of per capita  GDP  in 1987  US  dollars  adjusted  for purchasing
power  parity.14  For 152  countries,  we obtain  this data  directly  from  World  Bank
estimates  of PPP-adjusted  per  capita  GDP  as reported  in the World  Development
Indicators.  For  a further  10 countries  we  have data  on per capita  GDP converted  to
dollars  using  market  exchange  rates  in the World  Development  Indicators,  and we use  a
regression  of the log-level  of per  capita  GDP  at PPP  on the log-level  of per capita  GDP
at market  exchange  rates  to crudely  impute  PPP  adjustments  for these  countries.
Finally,  for the remaining  16  countries  for which  neither  measure  is available,  we use
data  for per  capita  incomes  at PPP  in 1997  from the 1998  CIA Factbook  (CIA (1998)).
We obtain  data  on infant  mortallity  and adult  literacy  primarily  from the  World
Development  Indicators,  supplemented  for a few countries  from the CIA Factbook.  Our
data on linguistic  variables  are based  on  the data  reported  by Hall  and Jones  for their
sample  of 151  countries,  and are extended  to our  larger  sample  of 178  countries  using
Grimes  (1996).
Results
Our empirical  results  show  a strong  positive  causal  relationship  from improved
govemance  to better  development  outcomes.  In Table  2, we present  the results  for per
capita  incomes. The rows  of this table report  our  results  for each  of the six governance
aggregates  when  entered  separately  in Equation  (4). In the first two columns  we report
the 2SLS  estimates  of P  and  the associated  standard  errors,  for each of these  indicators
The most  striking  feature  of these  results  is that the magnitudes  of the estimated
coefficients  are very  large. To see  this, recall  that our  choice  of units  for governance
implies  that the standard  deviation  of governance  across  countries  is equal  to one.
Therefore,  the coefficient  on govemance  can be interpreted  as the 100x(eP-1)-percent
increase  in per capita  incomes  due to a one-standard  deviation  improvement  in
govemance.  The  estimated  coefficients  in the top panel  of Table  2 (corresponding  to the
largest  possible  sample  of countries  for each indicator)  indicate  that a one standard
deviation  improvement  in govemance  leads  to between  a 2.5-fold  (in the case  of voice
and accountability)  and a 4-fold (in  the case  of political  instability  and  violence)  increase
in per capita  income. These  results  clearly  indicate  that there  is a large  payoff  in terms
14  The slight  difference  in timing  between  the govemance  and  per  capita  income  measures  is driven  entirely
by  data  availability.  Given  that  the time  series  variation  in these  indicators  is very  small  relative  to  the cross-
sectional  variation,  this  discrepancy  is unlikely  to influence  our  results.
15of per capita income to improvements in governance.  In other words, governance does
matter.
The next two columns report the results of two key specification tests which are
crucial to the plausibility of this simple empirical specification. In the first of these we
report the p-value associated with the null hypothesis that the instruments affect income
only through their effects on governance. For five out of the six governance measures,
we do not reject this null hypothesis, which we interpret as evidence in favour of our
identifying assumptions  ELx 1 *  eJ] = 0 and E[x  *  u;] = 0 .15
In the next column we summarize the strength of our instruments by reporting
the F-statistic from the first-stage regressions of each govemance indicator on the
instruments. In all cases the F-statistic is highly significant, suggesting that the
instruments have significant explanatory power for govemance. Although this
consideration  is irrelevant asymptotically, in finite samples weak instruments may cause
the 2SLS estimates to be biased  towards the probability limits of the OLS estimates. We
therefore take comfort in the finding that these linguistic variables appear to have very
good explanatory power for governance.  In summary, our specification tests in the full
sample of countries suggest that in all cases except graft, we can have considerable
confidence  that the 2SLS estimator is producing consistent estimates of 1 and captures
the causal effect from governance to per capita income.
In the remaining panels of Table 2 we report the same results for two
subsamples of interest. In order to ensure the comparability of the estimated coefficients
across indicators, we first restrict the sample to the set of 154 countries which appear in
all six govemance aggregates. Comparing the estimated coefficients in the first and
second panels, we find that the results are quite similar. This reassures us that the
differences in estimated coefficients across governance indicators do not simply reflect
differences in the samples of countries they cover.  In the bottom panel of Table 2 we
investigate whether our results are driven only by the differences between developed
15Only  in the case  of graft  do we reject  this hypothesis,  suggesting  that  our instruments  are inadequate  in
this case. This  is not  to say  that  graft is  unimportant  for  economic  outcomes.  Rather,  in this set  of
countries,  we have  found it is difficult  to find exogenous  variations  in the causes  of graft  which  make  it
possible  to identify  the effects  of  graft  on per  capita  incomes.  We do note  that the  tests of  overidentifying
restrictions  do pass  in the non-OECD  sample,  and  also  for  the other  development  indicators  as discussed
below.
16and developing  countries.  To do  this, we re-estimate  the six equations  excluding  all
OECD  economies  from  the sample.  The results  are  again  qualitatively  similar  in  that we
find large  and highly  significant  positive  effects  of governance  on per capita  incomes. 16
In Table  3, we report  a similar  set of results,  replacing  per  capita  incomes  in  turn
with  the logarithm  of infant  mortality  per  thousand  live births,  and the adult literacy  rate.
For each  of these  development  outcomes,  we re-estimate  our regressions  for the six
governance  indicators,  in the fulil  set of countries  and in the non-OECD  sample. Our
results  are very  similar  to those  for per  capita  incomes. Improved  governance  has  a
strong  negative  impact  on infant  mortality,  of proportionally  the same  magnitude  as for
per capita  incomes. Improved  governance  also  leads  to significant  increases  in adult
literacy,  with  a one-standard-deviation  increase  in governance  leading  to between  a 15
and  25 percentage  point  improvement  in literacy  in the full sample  of countries.  The
results  of the specification  tests  are  also qualitatively  similar.
16  The  only  difference  is  that the F-statistics  from  the first-stage  regressions  are  somewhat  weaker  in the
non-OECD  sample. This  raises  the  possibility  that  the  2SLS  results  are  biased  in the  direction  of the  OLS
estimates.  We do find, however,  that in the  full sample  of countries  the OLS  estimates  are  substantially
smaller  than  the 2SLS  estimates.  This  indicates  that  the downward  biases  due  to measurement  error
dominate  the possible  positive  biases  from  reverse  causation  or omitted  variables.  Based  on this,  we
speculate  that  the 2SLS  estimates  in the non-OECD  sample  if anything  understate  the true  effects  of
governance  in this sample.
175.  Conclusions
In this paper,  we have  documented  a new  database  of govemance  indicators
compiled  from a variety  of existing  sources.  These  indicators  report  the subjective
perceptions  of respondents  regarding  the quality  of various  aspects  of govemance.  We
summarize  a subset  of these  indicators  using  six aggregate  govemance  indicators
capturing  six core  concepts  of governance.  Govemance,  as measured  by these
indicators,  matters  a great  deal  for economic  outcomes.  We have provided  new
evidence  of a strong  positive  causal  relationship  from govemance  to better  development
outcomes.
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20Table 1: Sourc,es  of Quantitative  Measures  of Governance
Code  Source  Publication  Nature  Country  Coverage
Coverage  Index
BERI  Business  Business  Risk  Poll  50 mostly  0.44
Environment  Risk  Setrvice  developed
Intelligence  countries
CEER  Wall  Street  Journal  Central  European  Survey  27 transition  0.85
Economic  Review  economies
DRI  Standard  and Poors  Country  Risk  Review  Poll  106  developed  0.23  t
DRI/McGraw-Hill  and developing
countries
EBRD  European  Bank  for  Transition  Report  Poll  26 transition  0.85
Reconstruction  and  economies
Development
EIU  Economist  Country  Risk  Poll  114  developed  0.19  *
Intelligence  Unit  Service,  & Country  and developing
Forecast  countries
FH  Freedom  House  Fredom  in the World  Poll  172  developed  0.03 *
and  developing
countries
Nations  in Transit  Poll  28  transition  0.82
economies
GALLUP  Gallup  Intemational  50th  Anniversary  Survey  44 mostly  0.50
Survey  developed
countries
GCS  World  Economic  Global  Survey  54 developed  0.42
Forum  C:ompetitiveness  and  developing
S;urvev  countries
GCSA  World  Economic  Global  Survey  23 African  0.73
Forum  Competitiveness  countries
Survey,  Africa
HFWSJ  Heritage  Economic  Freedom  Poll  154  developed  0.06  *
Foundation/Wall  Index  and  developing
Street  Joumal  countries
PERC  Political  Economic  Asia  Intelligence  Survey  11  Asian  0.83
Risk  Consultancy  countries
PRS  Political  Risk  Intemational  Country  Poll  140  developed  0.10  *
Services  Risk  Guide  and  developing
countries
WCY  Institute  World  Survey  46 primarily  0.59
Management  Competitiveness  developed
Development  Yearbook  countries
WDR  World  Bank  World  Development  Survey  74 developed  0.25*
Report  and  developing
countries
Notes:  Poll  stands  for "polls  of  experts"  and  Survey  for "survey  of entrepeneurs"  (except  gallup,  which  is a
survey  of citizens)
(*) Representative  source
21Figure 1: Aggregate  Governance  Indicators
(i)  Process  by Which Those  in Authority are Selected,  Monitored and Replaced
(a) Voice  and  Accountability  (b) Political  Instability  and  Violence
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(ii) The Capacity  of Government  to Manage  Resources  and Implement Sound Policies
(a) Govemment  Effectiveness  (b) Regulatory  Burden
(III) Respect  of  Citizens  and  the  State  for  the  Institutions  of  Society
(a) Rule  of Law  (b) Graft S  T  ,  TJ  .&Aa  i  110r,1w  1  __  gE 
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Notes:  Each  graph  reports  the  value  of  the  governance  index  (on  the  vertical  axis)  for each
country  (on  the  horizontal  axis),  together  with  a 90%  confidence  interval.  The  horizontal
lines  indicate  the first,  second  and  third  quartiles  of the distribution  of govenance.  Counties
are ordered  in ascending  order  from  left to right. Higher  values  of each  index  correspond  to
better  outcomes.
22Figure 2: Governance  and Per Capita Incomes
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Notes:  Each  graph  plots  the  indicated  governance  aggregate  (on  the  horizontal  axis)
against  the  logarithm  of per  capita  GDP  at  PPP  (on  the  vertical  axis)  for  the  sample  of
countries  covered  by  the  governance  aggregate.
23Figure 3: Governance  and Infant Mortality
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Notes: Each  graph  plots  the indicated  governance  aggregate  (on  the horizontal  axis)
against  the logarithm  of infant  mortality  per  thousand  live births  (on  the vertical  axis)  for the
sample  of countries  covered  by the  govemance  aggregate.
24Figure 4: Governance and Adult  Literacy
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25Table  2: Regression  Results  for Per  Capita  Income
Dependent  variable  is the logarithm  of per capita  GDP at PPP
P-Value  for  F-statistic
2SLS  Test of Overidentifying from first-stage  Number  of
a  s.e.  Restrictions  Rearession  Observations
Full Sample
Voice and Accountability  0.888  0.109  0.167  23.025  173
Political Instability  and Violence  1.394  0.177  0.485  6.301  155
Govemment  Effectiveness  1.102  0.128  0.127  12.080  156
Regulatory  Burden  1.133  0.143  0.874  18.413  166
Rule of Law  1.335  0.179  0.122  7.983  166
Graft  0.990  0.112  0.018  12.069  155
Sample of Countries Appearing in All Six Aggregates
Voice and Accountability  0.907  0.123  0.175  17.559  154
Political Instability and Violence  1.390  0.177  0.491  5.979  154
Govemment  Effectiveness  1.095  0.130  0.106  11.177  154
Regulatory  Burden  1.085  0.155  0.792  16.998  154
Rule  of Law  1.237  0.171  0.071  6.952  154
Graft  0.977  0.111  0.017  11.567  154
Non-OECD Sample
Voice and Accountability  0.685  0.143  0.093  14.259  149
Political Instability  and Violence  1.811  0.532  0.712  1.190  131
Govemment  Effect(veness  1.561  0.452  0.486  2.552  132
Regulatory  Burden  0.880  0.169  0.990  11.250  142
Rule of Law  2.079  0.670  0.365  1.227  142
Graft  1.192  0.317  0.096  2.227  131
26Table 3: Regression Results  for Other Development  Outcomes
P-Value  for  F-statistic
2SLS  Test of Overidentifying from first-stage  Number  of
- p  s.e.  Restrictions  Rearession  Observations
Dependent Variable is Infant Mortality Per 1000 Live Births
Full Sample
Voice and Accountability  -0.847  0.118  0.324  23.025  173
Political  Instability and Violence  -1.408  0.212  0.610  6.301  155
Govemment  Effectiveness  -1.124  0.165  0.283  12.080  156
Regulatory  Burden  -1.101  0.142  0.816  18.413  166
Rule  of Law  -1.361  0.218  0.126  7.983  166
Graft  -1.025  0.140  0.013  12.069  155
Non-OECD  Sample
Voice and Accountability  -0.636  0.169  0.309  14.259  149
Political  Instability and Violence  -1.842  0.722  0.966  1.190  131
Govemment  Effectiveness  -1.573  0.590  0.853  2.552  132
Regulatory  Burden  -0.812  0.186  0.790  11.250  142
Rule of Law  -2.211  0.977  0.445  1.227  142
Graft  -1.495  0.533  0.149  2.227  131
Dependent Variable is Adult Literacy  Rate In Percent
Full Sample
Voice and Accountability  '15.102  1.690  0.164  23.025  173
Political  Instability and Violence  26.140  5.242  0.611  6.301  155
Govemment  Effectiveness  20.445  3.911  0.336  12.080  156
Regulatory  Burden  20.902  2.809  0.932  18.413  166
Rule  of Law  25.167  5.354  0.220  7.983  166
Graft  18.602  3.544  0.080  12.069  155
Non-OECD  Sample
Voice and Accountability  15.857  2.688  0.103  14.259  149
Political Instability  and Violence  !55.701  20.129  0.791  1.190  131
Govemment  Effectiveness  44.342  13.794  0.987  2.552  132
Regulatory  Burden  22.281  4.224  0.672  11.250  142
Rule of Law  .54.679  21.820  0.473  1.227  142
Graft  :36.789  8.252  0.269  2.227  131
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28A1.1  Business  Environment  Risk  Intelligence  (BERI)
BERI  S.A. is a private  source  of analysis  and  forecasts  of the business  environment  in a
number  of countries.  The firm was  founded  in 1966 and is headquartered  in Geneva,
Switzerland.  As of May 1999,  BERI  can  be  reached  at http:I/www.beri.com.
BERI  has  two services  that include  variables  of interest  for the purpose  of this paper:  The
Business  Risk  Service,  and The FORELEND  or Lender  Risk  Rating. We use  data  from the
February  1998  version  of Business  Risk  Service. Both  services  are supervised  by Dr. F.T.
Haner,  founder  and  senior  editor.  Eighteen  analysts  analyze  various  data  sources  and  produce
initial  draft reports,  relying  on an international  network  of sources  for intelligence  on countries.
BERI  convenes  two permanent  panetls  of about  105  experts  from all over  the world. These
panels  provide  country  ratings  and  qualitative  observations  on  the basis  of these  initial  reports.
One panel  assesses  political  conditions,  and  the other  offers  perspectives  on the business
operating  environment.  These  ratings  are  constructed  using  the Delphi  method,  in which
panelists  are  also supplied  with  the ratings  they produced  in previous  assessments  as well  as
the panel  average  score  for each  measure.
BRS  monitors  50  countries  three  times  per  year,  assessing  57 criteria  separated  into  three
indices. The Political  Risk  Index  (PFI)  focuses  on sociopolitical  conditions  in a country.
Diplomats  and political  scientists  rate  the present  condition  of eight causes  and two symptoms
of political  risk,  using  a scale  from 7 (no  problem)  to 0 (prohibitive  problem).  The Operation  Risk
Index  (ORI)  identifies  major  bottlenecks  for business  development,  rating 15  criteria  on  a scale
of 0 (unacceptable  conditions)  to 4 (superior  conditions).  The R factor assesses  a country's
willingness  to allow  foreign  companiles  to convert  and  repatriate  profits  and  to import
components,  equipment  and raw materials.  It is composed  of 4 sub-indices,  one of which
assesses  the quality  of legal  framework  in terms  of statutory  laws  and actual  practice.17  The
components  of the PRI  and ORI  are reported  in Table  Al.1.
7 Unfortunately,  this  index  has  not  yet  been  made  available  to  us.
29Table A1.1 Business Environment  Risk Intelligence
Political Risk Index (PRI)
Intemal Causes  of Political Risk
I  Fractionalization  of  the political  spectrum  and  the power  of these  factions.
2  Mentality,  including  xenophobia,  nationalism,  corruption,  nepotism,  willingness  to
compromise,  etc.
3  Fractionalization  by language,  ethnic  and/or  religious  groups  and the  power  of these  factions.
4  Social  conditions,  including  population  density  and wealth  distribution.
5  Restrictive  (coercive)  measures  required  to retain  power.
6  Organization  and  strength  of forces  for a radical  govemment.
External Causes  of Political Risk
7  Dependence  on and/or  importance  to a major  hostile  power.
8  Neqative  influences  of reqional  political  forces.
Svmptoms  of Political Risk
9 Societal  conflict  involving  demonstrations,  strikes,  and  street  violence.
10 Instability  as perceived  by non-constitutional  changes,  assassinations,  and cuerilla  wars.
Operation Risk Index (ORI)
11  Policy  Continuity
12  Enforceability  of contracts
13  Attitude  towards  foreign  investors  and  profits
14  labor  Costs/Productivity
15  Degree  of privatization
16  Professional  services  and contractors
17  Monetary  inflation
18  Communications  and  transportation
19  Balance  of Payments
20  Local  management  and  partners
21  Bureaucratic  Delays
,22  Short-term  credit
23  Economic  Growth
24  Long-term  loans  and  venture  capital
25  Currency  convertibility
30A1.2 The Wall Street Journal Central European Economic Review (CEER)
The Central and Eastern Europe Review (CEER) is part of the European branch of the
Wall Street Journal (WSJ), an American publishing  company. As of May 1999 the CEER can be
reached at: http:/linteractive.wsj.com/public/current/summaries/ceer98-2.htm
Since 1995, CEER carries out an annual survey of business analysts in Europe and the
United States regarding the economic situation in Eastern Europe.  Respondents are asked  to
rate 27 Eastem European countries on their attractiveness as a place to do business over the
coming year, based on their perceptl  ons of factors including corruption, rule of law and political
stability. The factors considered in tShe  survey are reported in Table A1.2.  To the best of our
knowledge, respondents in this surveBy  are not provided with definitions of the specific concepts
on which they are asked to rate countries.
CEER reports the average response in their December/January issue. We use data from
the December/January 1999 issue for political stability and rule of law, and data from the
December/January 1998 issue for corruption.
Table  A1.2:  The  Wall  Street  Journal
Central  European  Economic  Review
Concepts  Measured  in 1998  Survey
1 Economic  Strength
2 Balance  of Payments
3 Business  Ethics
4 Integration  into  World  Economy
5 Liquidity/Ease  of Buying  Stocks
6 Rule  of Law
7 Price  Stability
8 Productivity
9 Currency  Stability/lnvestment  Climate
10 Political  Stability
Concepts  Measured  in 1997  Survey
11 Economic  Growth
12 Price  Stability
13 Integration  into  World  Economy
14 Currency  Stability/lnvestment  Climate
15 Rule  of Law
16 Ease  of Portfolio  Position
17 Productivity
18 Balance  of Payments
19 Political  Stability
20 Corruption
31A1.3  Standard and Poor's DRI/McGraw-Hill  (DRI)
DRI is an economic consulting and information  company which provides data, analysis,
forecasts and expert advice to strategic planners, business and financial analysts, and policy
makers. It was founded in 1973 as a unit of Standard & Poors and is based in the United
States. As of May 1999, DRI can be contacted at: http://204.151.55.106/index.htm.
In 1996, DRI launched the Country Risk Review (CRR), a quarterly publication providing
country risk assessments  to international investors. A first draft of the risk ratings in this
publication are produced by country analysts, who then submit their preliminary assessment to
regional review committees  charged with analyzing and challenging these assessment. The
global risk service committee evaluates the reviewed assessments to ensure quality and cross-
country consistency. The country analysts then produce the final country risk review.  In this
paper we use data from the first quarter of 1998  version of the Country Risk Review.
The CRR assesses the relationship  between country risk and its effects on the
profitability of investments. For each country, DRI identifies a number of "potential sources of
risk", specifies measurable  "risk events", measures  how probable those risk events are, and
assesses the seventy of impact that each outcome would have. Based on these considerations,
DRI produces a risk score for each country.
The CRR identifies a total of 33 "immediate risk events" and 18 "secondary risk events"
for 106 developed and developing countries. Immediate risk events are classified into policy
risks (tax, and non-tax), and outcome risks (price, and non-price). Secondary risk events are
classified into domestic political risks, extemal political risks, and economic risks.  These risk
events are described in Table A1.3.
For each risk event, DRI produces a short run and a long run risk rating.  These ratings
provide subjective estimates of the likelihood that a particular risk event will occur within one
and five years respectively. DRI follows a methodology  to ensure that the five year forecasts
are consistent with the short-term forecasts.  Although these indicators nominally measure the
likelihood of future changes in govemance concepts, in practice the long-run ratings provide
good measures  of the current levels of govemance. 18
This  judgement  is based  on a private  communication  with  Farid  Abolfathi,  Director  of  the Country  Risk  Review.  In
response  to our  request  of advice  as to whether  to use DRI's  risk  ratings  on corruption  as a proxy  for current  levels  of
corruption  he replied:  'Our approach  focuses  on the risk  of increases  in corruption,  but our  experience  has  been  that
these  are  highly  correlated  to corruption  levels,  particularly  in a sample  with  large  variance.  Finally,  if you are  mainly
interested  in using  our numbers  as a proxy  for  corruption  levels  in a cross  section  of countries,  I recommend  using
the  five-year  ones."
32Table  A1.3.  Standard  and Poor's  DR  UMcGraw-HIll:  Country  Risk  Service  Immediate  Risk Events
Risk  Event  Defintion
POLICIES  TAX
I  Capital  Gains  Taxes  A 1  0-percentage  point  increase  in the  rate  of  capital  aains  tax  for foreign-owned  businesses
2 Corporate  Taxes  A 1  0-percentage  point  increase  in the  rate  of  corporate  income  tax  during  any 12-month
period.
3  Export  Taxes  A 5-percentage  point  increase  in the  average  rate  of  export  taxes  during  any 12-month  period.
4  ImportTaxes  A 10-percentage  point  increase  in the  average  rate  of import  taxes/tariffs  during  any 12-month
period.
5 Labor  Taxes  A 5-percentage  point  increase  in the rate  of labor  tax  (social  security,  etc.)  during  any 12-
month  period.
6  Sales  Taxes  A 5-percentage  poilit  increase  in the  average  rate  of sales  taxes  during  any 12-month  period.
7  Withholding  Taxes  A 5-percentage  poi  nt  increase  in the  average  rate  of withholding  taxes  during  any  12-month
period.
POLICIES  NON-TAX
8  Enforceability  of  Al  point  decline  on  a scale  from 0' to  "10" in the  enforceability  of contracts  during  any  12-
Govemment  Contracts  month  period.
9  Enforceability  of Private  A 1-point  decline  on a scale  from 0' to 10"  in the legal  enforceability  of contracts  during  any
Contracts  12-month  period.
10 Ownership  of Business  by  A 1-point  increase  on  a  scae from  "0"  to "10"  in legal  restrictions  on ownership  of business  by
Non-Residents  non-residents  during  any 12-month  period.
11 Ownership  of Equities  by  A 1-point  increase  on a  scale  from  "0"  to "10"  in legal  restrictions  on ownership  of equities  by
Non-Residents  non-residents  during  any 12-month  period.
12 Regulatons  - An increase  in environmental  regulatons,  with respect  to  their  level  at  the time  of the
Environmental  assessment,  that  reduces  total  aggregate  investment  in real  LCU  terms  by  5 percentage
points.
13 Regulabtions  - Exports  A 2%  reduction  in export  volume  as  a  result  of a  worsening  in export  regulations  or
restrictions  (such  gis  export  limits)  during  any  12-month  period,  with  respect  to the  level  at  the
timne  of the  assessment
14 Regulations  - Imports  A 2%  reduction  in import  volume  as  a result  of a  worsening  in import  regulations  or
restrictions  (such  as import  quotas)  during  any  12-month  period,  with  respect  to the  level  at
the Ume  of  the assessment
15 Regulations  - Other  An increase  in other  regulatory  burdens,  with  respect  to the level  at  the bme  of  the
Business  assessment,  that  reduces  total  aggreaate  investment  in real  LCU  terms  bv 10%
16 Transferabilty  of Funds  A 1-point  increase  on a  scale  from  "0 to '10  in restrictions  on non-resident  outward  transfer
of  funds  during  any  12-month  period.
OUTCOMES  PRICE
Measures  included:  Real  Currency  Depreciation  (vs.  USS),  Equity  Prices  (in real  LCU),  Currency  Appreciation,
Factor  Costs  - Ccmmercial  Real  Estate  Costs,  Factor  Costs  - Construction  Materials  Prices,
Factor  Costs  - Power  and Energy  Prices.  Factor  Costs  - Wages
OUTCOMES  NON-PRICE
17 Losses  and  Costs  of  A 1-point  increase  on a  scale  from  "0"  to "10"  in corruption  during  any  12-month  period.
Corruption
18 Losses  and  Costs  of Crime  A 1-point  increase  on a  scale  from  7"  to "10"  in crime  during  any 12-month  period.
Other  measures  included: Default  / Restructuring  by  Banks,  Default  I Restructuring  on  Govt USS  loans,  Domestic
Demand,  Export  Disruption  (Sanctions/trade  conflict),  Import  Disruption  (Sanctons/trade
conflict),  Infrastructure  Disrupbon  or  Shortage,  Losses  and Costs  of Physical  Hazards,  Skilled-
Labor  Shortages
33Table A1.3.  Standard  and Poor's  DRI/McGraw-Hill  (cont.): Country Risk Service  Secondary Risk Events
Risk  Event  Defintion
DOMESTIC  POLITICAL  RISKS
19 Military  Coup  Risk  A military  coup  d'etat (or  a series  of such  events)  that  reduces  the GDP  orowth rate  by  2%
20 Major  InsurgencylRebellion  An increase  in scope  or intensity  of one  or more  insurgencies/rebellions  that reduces  the GDP
growth  rate  by  3%  during  any 12-month  period.
21 Political  Terrorism  An increase  in scope  or intensity  of  terrorism  that reduces  the GDP growth  rate by 1%  dunng
any 12-month  Deriod.
22 Political  Assassination  A political  assassination  (or a  series  of such  events)  that reduces  the GDP growth  rate  by 1%
during  any 12-month  period.
23 Civil War  An increase  in scope  or intensity  of  one or more  civil wars  that reduces  the GDP growth  rate
by 4%  during  anv 12-month  Period.
24 Major  Urban  Riot  An increase  in scope,  intensity,  or frequency  of rioting  that reduces  the GDP  growth  rate  by
1%  during  any 12-month  period.
25 Labor  Strike  and Unrest  An increase  in scope,  intensity,  or frequency  of labor  strikes/turmoil  that reduces  the GDP
growth  rate  bv 1%  during  any 12-month  period.
26 Kidnapping  of Foreigners An increase  in scope,  intensity,  or frequency  of kidnapping  of foreigners  that reduces  the GDP
arowth  rate  by 1%  during  any 12-month  period.
27 Govemment  Instability  An increase  in govemment  personnel  tumover  rate  at senior  levels  that reduces  the GDP
qrowth  rate  by  2%  during  anY  12-month  period.
28 Govemment  A decline  in govemment  personnel  quality  at  any level  that reduces  the GDP  growth  rate  by
Ineffectiveness  1%  during  any 12-month  period.
29 Institutional  Failure  A deterioration  of govemment  capacity  to cope  with national  problems  as a result  of
institutional  rigidity  or gridlock  that reduces  the  GDP growth  rate  by 1%  during  any 12-month
period.
EXTERNAL  POLITICAL  RISKS
30 Military  Mobilization/Small  An increase  in scope  or intensity  of an inter-state  military  conflict  that reduces  the GDP
Inter-State  War  growth  rate  by  2-5%  during  any 12-month  period.
31 Major  Inter-State  War  An increase  in scope  or intensity  of a military  conflict  that reduces  the GDP  growth  rate by
more  than  5%  during  any 12-month  period.
Other  measures  included:  Economic  Sanction  Risk.  Trade  Conflict  Risk
ECONOMIC  RISKS
Other  measures  included: Interest  Rate  (Real  increase),  Consumer  Price Inflation,  Real  Estate  Price Decline
(Commercial)
34A1.4  European  Bank  for Reconstruction  and  Development  (EBRD)
The EBRD  is an intemational  organization  dedicated  to fostering  the transition  towards
open  market-oriented  economies  and promoting  private  and entrepreneurial  initiative  in the
countries  of Central  and Eastern  Europe  and  the Commonwealth  of Independent  States  (CIS).
The EBRD  is based  in London,  and as of May  1999  can be  reached  at http://www.ebrd.orQ.
The EBRD  publishes  an annual  Transition  Report,  which  includes  a number  of
governance  variables  in its Transition  Indicators  and Survey  of Legal  Reforms.  We use  data
from  the 1998  edition  of the Transition  Report.
Transition  Indicators
The  Transition  Report  The EBRD  presents  eight  "Transition  Indicators"  whose  goal is to
represent  the cumulative  progress  in the movement  from a centrally  planned  economy  to a
market  economy."  The indicators  are based  on an a subjective  analysis  of objective  data  in  a
number  of issues  (checklist).  Table  A1.4  presents  a defailed  description  of these  indicators.
Legal  Reform  Survey
In 1998,  the EBRD  conducted  a survey  of local  public  officials,  private  firms,  academics,
lawyers,  and other  experts,  in order  to assess  the progress  made  in financial  legal  reform  in
transition  economies.  The  survey  considered  two areas  of financial  legal  reform:  banking  and
securities  activities.  For each  area,  two indices  describing  the extensiveness  and  effectiveness
of the financial  legal  framework  were developed,  for a total  of four ratings.  The "extensiveness"
ratings  measure  how  closely  legal  r  ules affecting  investment  follow  international  standards.
"Effectiveness"  reflects  how clear,  accessible  and adequately-supported  the legal  rules  are.
Both  are intended  to provide  a measure  of how  conducive  the laws  of these  countries  are  to
fostering  investment.  This survey  covered  26 countries.  Table  A1.4 presents  a detailed
description  of each  of the ratings.
35Table AlA.  European Bank for Reconstruction  and Development
Transition  Report, Transition Indicators
Score Definifion
1 Large Scale privatization
1  LitLe private ownership
2  Comprehensive  scheme almost ready for implementation,  some sales completed
3  More than 25% of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the process of being privatized but
possible with major unresolved issues regarding corporate  govemance
4  More than 50%  of state-owned enterprise and form assets in private ownership and significant progress on
corporate govemance of these enterprises
5  Standards and performance tvpical
2 Small Scale  privatization
1 Little  Drogress
2  Substantal share  privatized
3  Nearly comprehensive  proaram implemented
4  Complete privatization of small comDanies  with tradable ownershiD  rights
5  Standards and performance typical of advance  industial economies: no estate ownership of small enterprises
effective tradabilitv of land
3 Govemance  and restructuring
1 Soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening  financial discipline at the enterprise level);
few other reforms to promote corporate govemance
2  Moderately  tight credit and subsidy policy but weak enforcement  of bankruptcy legislation and little action taken
to strengthen  comDetition  and corporate govemance
3  Significant and substanbal  actions to harden budget constraints and to promote  cooperate govemance
effectivelv
4  Standards and performance typical of advance  d industrial economies:  effective corporate control exercised
throuoh domestic financial institutions and markets, fosterina market-driven  restructurina
4 Price liberalization
1  Most prices  formally controlled by the govemment
2  Price controls  for several important product categories,  state procurement at non-market prices remains
substantal
3  Substantial progress on price liberalization:  state Procurement  at non-market prices largeiv phased out
4  Comprehensive  price liberalization, utilitv pricng which reflects economic costs
5  Standards and performance typical of advance  industrial economies, comprehensive  price liberalization,
efficiency-enhancing  regulation of ublity pricing
5 Trade and foreign exchange system
1  Widespread import and /or export controls or very limited legitimate access to foreign exchange
2  Some liberalization of import and/or  export controls, almost full current account convertibility  in principle but with
a foreign exchange regime that is not fully transparent
3  Removal  of almost all quantitatve and administrative import and export restrictions,  almost full current account
convertibility
4  Removal  of all quantitative  and administrative  import and export restrictions  and all significant export tariffs,
insignificant direct involvement in exports and imports by ministries  and state owned trading companies no major
non-uniformity of customs dubtes  for non-agricultural  goods and services, full current account convertibility
5  Standards  and performance norms of most advance  d industrial economies:  removal of most tariff barriers,
membership  in WTO
6 Banking reform & interest rate liberalisaton
1  Little  proaress  beyond  establishment  of a  tMo-ter  svstem
2  Significant  liberalisation  of interest  rates  and  credit  allocation;  limited  use  of  directed  credit  or interest  rate
liberalisabon  ceilings
3  Substantial  progress  in establishment  of  bank  solvency  and  of a  framework  for prudential  supervision  and
regulation;  full interest  rate  liberalisation  with litLe  preferential  access  to cheap  refinancing;  significant  lending  to
private  enterprises  and  significant  presence  of pDrivate  banks
4  Significant  movement  of  banking  laws  and regulation  towards  BIS  standards;  well-functioning  banking
compeUtion  and effective  prudential  supervision;  significant  term  lending  to  private  enterprises;  substantial
financial  deepening
5  Standards  and performance  norms  of  advanced  industrial  economies:  full  convergence  of banking  laws  and
requlations  with  815  standards;  provision  of full set  of  competitive  bankina  services
7 Securities  markets  & non-bank  financial  institutions
1 Little  Progress
2  Formation  of securities  exchanges,  market-makers  and  brokers;  some  trading  in govemment  paper  and/or
securites:  rudimentary  legal  and regulatorv  framework  for the  issuance  and tradina  of securities
3  Substantial  issuance  of  securities  by  prvate  enterprises;  establishment  of independent  share  registries,  secure
clearance  and  settlement  procedures,  and  some  protection  of minority  shareholders;  emergence  of  non-bank
financial  institutions  (e.g. investment  funds,  private  insurance  and pension  funds,  leasing  companies)  and
associated  reaulatory  framework
4  Securifies  laws  and  regulations  approaching  IOSCO  standards;  substantial  market  liquidity  and capitalisation;
well-functioning  non-bank  financial  insttutions  and  effective  reaulation
36Table Ai.4.  European Bank for Reconstruction  and Development (cont)
Transoiion Report, Progress in Financial Transition
8 The extensiveness  of legal rules on banking  and securities  activities
1  Legal rules goveming banking  and securities  are very limited in scope. For  example, capital adequacy
standards  and restricions on affiliated  lending in banking  do not exist.  There may be no functioning stock
exchange in this jurisdiction, or the iapital  markets'  legal infrastructure  may be in its earliest  stage of
development.
2  Legal rules goveming banking  and securities  are somewhat  limited in scope.  Although regulations in banking
have been  amended to accord with core principles,  at least one important  area of regulation  remains deficient -
for example, capital adequacy, use of intemational  accounting  standards,  use of consolidated  comprehensive
supervision.  Oversight of securities  markets  is limited, and regulation  of securities intermediaries  and investment
funds, for example, are either non-existent  or rudimentary.
3  Legislation  for banking  and securffies  acbvities is reasonably comprehensive  but  would benefit  from further
refinement in some areas. Banking regulabons  generally  conform to the Basic Committees Core Principles,
although regulabons  conceming bank insolvency  and deposit protection  may not have been  adopted. Further
refinement  to regulation  of securities  intermediaries  and/or Investment  funds and  creation of shareholder
depositories and registers  is needed to achieve conformity  with minimum intematonal standards.
4  Comprehensive  regulaton exists with respect to banking  and securities  activities that conforms  generally to
minimum intemational  standards.  But refinement  is stil  needed in at least one important aspect of either
banking  or securities regulation. For example, many  countries in this category  still need  to enact rules
conceming  money laundering  (including "know  your customer' provisions)  or bank insolvency.  Legislation
comnceing shareholder  depositoriejs  and registries is either non-existent  or is in its early stages of
implementabon.
5 Banking and capital markets legislabton  and regulation  is comprehensive  and conforms  to minimum intemational
standards.
9 The effectveness of legal rules on banking  and securities  activites
I  Legal rules goveming financial institutions  and markets are usually very unclear and often contradictory.  The
regulatory support of the laws is rudimentary.  Supervisory  mechanisms  are either  non-existent or poor. There
are no meaningful  procedures in place  to make financial  laws and reaulations  fully operabonal
2  Legal nules  are somewhat unctear  and sometmes contradictory.  Supervision  of banking  and securites
activifies exists on an ad hoc basis.  But there are few, if nay, meaningful  procedures in place to enforce the law.
There mav be a lack of adequately trained staff in either  bankina  or capital markets  regulatory authorites
3 Although  legal rules governing  banking  and securities  activities are reasonably clear, regulatory and supervisory
support of the law may be inconsis,tent  so as to create a degree  of uncertainty.  Although  the regulator may
have engaged in corrective actionm  against  failing banks and securibes  markets practices,  enforcement  problems
still exist
4  Lega rules goveming banking  and securities  activities are readily  ascertainable.  Banking and securites laws
are generally well supported  administratvely and judicially, particulady  regarding  the efficient functioning of
enforcement measures  against  failing insttutions and illegal market practices.  For example, the regulator has
taken correcbve  action  against individuals  and securifes intermediaries  are evident but could still benefit  from
more systematc and rigorous enforcement  Courts  have the authority to review enforcement  decisions or other
corrective actions for banks  and/or securites firms.
5 Regulators possess  comprehensive  enforcement  powers  and exercise  authority to take correcbve  acton on a
regular basis.  Examination  of securities  intermediaries  and licensing of intermediaries  is frequent, as is the use
of corrective action, such as prosecution  for insider  dealing, revocaton of bank licences, liquidation  of insolvent
banks and consolidation  of banks
37A1.5  The Economist  Intelligence Unit (EIU)
The Economist Intelligence Unit is a for-profit organization producing analysis and
forecasts of the political, economic and business  environment in more than 180 countries. The
EIU was founded in 1949 and is based in London. As of May 1999, the  EIU can be reach at
htto:l/www.eiu.com.
In 1997,  the EIU launched two quarterly publications  which contain some govemance
measures:  The Country Risk Service, and the Country Forecasts. The assessments in these
publications are based on regular contributions  from a global network of more than 500
information-gatherers. A panel of regional experts checks the accuracy, consistency and
impartiality of these assessments. In this paper,  we combine data from the 1999 first quarter
edition of the Country Risk Service, and from the 1994-98 historical risk rating from the Country
Forecast.
Country Risk Service (CRS)
The CRS provides intemational investors with risk ratings for seven broad categories of
country risk-Political,  Economic Policy, Economic Structure, Liquidity, Currency, Sovereign
Debt, and Banking Sector-and  covers 100 emerging markets. Within each category,
subjective assessments  are produced for a number  of sub-issues.  However, only the seven
broad risk ratings are actually published. 19
The Political Risk category is the most relevant rating for the purposes of this paper. It is
divided into elements of Political Stability and elements of Political Effectiveness.  Political
stability asks whether the political scene is free of internal or external threats to security.
Political effectiveness  examines the quality of govemance.
Country Forecasts (CF)
The CFs measure the quality or attractiveness of the business environment in 60
countries. The rankings examine ten separate criteria-the  political environment, the
macroeconomic  environment, market opportunities, policy towards free enterprise and
competition,  policy towards foreign investment,  foreign trade and exchange controls, taxes,
financing, the labor market and infrastructure  and are designed to reflect the main criteria used
by companies to formulate their global business strategies. Each criteria covers a number
issues for which two assessments  are produced: A historical rating, covering the last 5 years,
and a forecast rating covering the next five years.
For the purpose of this paper,  the most interesting criteria covered is the political
environment. All the issues covered under this heading are based on subjective qualitative
assessments produced by EIU's staff.
Combining the CRS and CF Ratings
The Political Risk rating from the CRS and the Political Environment ratings from the CF
ratings cover almost identical concepts, although using different rating scales. We convert the
CF ratings to the same units as the CRS ratings, and augment the CRS ratings with the CF
19  Although,  these  estimates  are  produced  all that  is actually  published  are  the risk  ratings  for  the broad  categories.
We  would  like  to thank  Merli  Baroudi,  editor  of  the Country  Risk  Service,  for kindly  providing  us some  of  the sub-
components  of the Political  Risk  Index.
38ratings for the 14 mostly OECD economies  appearing in the CF but not the CRS. This results in
an indicator covering 114 developecd  and developing countries. 20
Table  A1.5  The  Economist  Intelligence  Unit.
Political  Stability
1 War  (Armed  conflict)
2 Social  unrest  (Social  unrest)
3 Orderly  political  transfers  (Change  in government)
4 Politically  motivated  violence  (Terrorism  threat)
5 Intemational  disputes  (Intemational  disputes)
Political Effectiveness
6 Pro business  orientation  (Govemment  policy)
7 Institutional  elfectiveness  (Government  efficacy)
8 Bureaucracy  (Red tape  bureaucracy)
9 Transparency/faimess  (Legal  system)
10 Corruption  (Corruption)
11 Crime  (Crime)
Country  Risk  Service  - Political  Risk  (In
parenthesis,  Country  Forecast  - Political
Environment)
20The  only  difference  between  these  two  sources  is  that  the CRS  makes  assessments  with  respect  to a specified
year  and  quarter,  while  the CF  provides  historical  averages  for  the  previous  five  years.  Given  the OECD  countries  in
the CF  that  we add  to the CRS  are  likely  to have  very  stable  govemance,  this discrepancy  in timing  is of minor
concern.
39Al.6  Freedom  House  (FHFW,  FHNT)
Freedom  House  is a non-governmental  organization  dedicated  to the promotion  of
democratic  values  around  the  world. Freedom  House  was  established  in 1941  and is
headquartered  in New  York City. As of May  1999,  Freedom  House  can  be reached  on  the web
at http://www.freedomhouse.ora.
In 1997  and 1998,  Freedom  House  produced  two publications  containing  governance
measures:  Freedom  in the World  and Nations  in Transit. Freedom  in the World  was launched
in 1955,  and became  an annual  publication  in 1978  with  a consistent  methodological  approach.
In 1997-98,  it covered  191  countries  and 60  related  territories.  Nations  in Transit  was launched
in 1995. In 1998,  it covered  28 post-communist  countries. In this paper  we use  data  from  the
1997-98  edition  of Freedom  in the  World  and  the 1998  edition  of Nations  in Transit.
Freedom  House  develops  its assessments  using  a team  of academic  advisors,  in-house
experts,  published  resources,  and local  correspondents  including  human  rights  activists,
journalists,  editors  and political  figures. Freedom  House  staff  also conduct  regular  fact-finding
missions  to countries  being  assessed.  An academic  advisory  board  provides  input  to the
project  in  general.
Freedom in the World (FHFW)
FHFW  evaluates  political  rights  and  civil liberties  around  the world. Freedom  House
defines  political  rights  as  those  freedoms  that enable  people  to participate  freely  in the political
process,  and  civil liberties  as the freedom  to develop  views,  institutions  and personal  autonomy
apart  from  the state. In 1997,  Freedom  House  also  published  an assessment  of freedom  of the
press,  taking  into  consideration  freedoms  in law  and in practice,  freedom  from political  and
economic  influence  over  media  content  and  actual  violations  of press  freedom  such  as arrests
or murders  of journalists
For all countries,  the subjective  assessments  are  based  on checklists  of rights  and
freedoms,  reported  in Table  A1.6. A Freedom  House  team  assigns  a rating  to each  item  on the
checklist  and produces  an initial  assessment  for each country.  The team  then  assess  whether
the checklists  might  have missed  an important  factor  for a particular  country. The scores  are
then  reviewed  to ensure  quality  and consistency  across  countries,  and a final rating  is produced.
Nations in Transit (FHNT)
FHNT  evaluates  the progress  in democratic  and economic  reform  in post-communist
countries.  Country  surveys  are written  by Freedom  House  staff  or consultants  and are reviewed
by academics  and senior  Freedom  House  staff. Each  report  is divided  into  nine  sections,
ranging  from  the political  process  to progress  in price  liberalization. For each  section,  a
preliminary  rating  is based  on  a checklist  of issues. The academic  oversight  board  establishes
the final ratings  by consensus  following  extensive  discussions  and  debate,  which  are reviewed
by the Freedom  House  rating  committee.
40Table A.1.6. Freedom House
Fredom in the World
I  Political  Rights
Is the head of state and/or  head  oil  government  or other  chief authority  elected  through  free and
fair elections?
Are the legislative  representatives  elected  through  free  and fair elections?
Are there fair electoral  laws?
Are the voters able  to endow  their  freely elected  representatives  with real power?
Do  the people have  the right  to freely organize  in different  political  parties  or other competitive
political  groupings  of their choice,  and is the system  open to the rise and fall of these competing
parties  or groupings?
Is there a significant  opposition  vote, de facto opposition  power,  and a realistic  possibility  for the
opposition  to increase  its support  or gain power  through  elections?
Are the people  free from domination  by  the military,  foreign  powers,  totalitarian  parties,  religious
hierarchies,  economic  oligarchies  or any other  powerful  groups?
Do cultural,  ethnic,  religious  and other  minority  groups have  reasonable  self-determination,  self-
govemment,  autonomy  or participation  through  informal  consensus  in the decision-making
process?
2  Civil Liberties
Are there free  and independent  media,  literature  and  other cultural  expressions?  (Note:  in cases
where  the media  are state  controlled  but offer pluralistic  points  of view,  the Survey  gives the
system  credit
Is there  open public  discussion  and free private  discussion?
Is there freedom  of assembly  and demonstration?
Is there  freedom  of political  or quasi-political  organization?
Are citizens equal under  the law, with access  to an independent,  nondiscriminatory  judiciary, and
are they respected  by the security  forces?
Is there  protection  from political  terror, and from unjustified  imprisonment,  exile  or torture,  whether
by groups  that support  or oppose  the system,  and freedom  from  war or insurgency  situations?
Are there  free trade  unions  and peasant  organizations  or equivalents,  and is there  effective
collective bargaining?
Are there free professional  and other private  organizations?
Are there  free businesses  or cooperatives?
Are there free religious  institutions  and free  private  and public religious  expressions?
Are there personal  social  freedorns,  which include  such aspects  as gender  equality,  property
rights,  freedom  of movement,  choice  of residence,  and choice  of marriage  and size of family?
Is there equality  of opportunity,  urhich  includes  freedom  from exploitation  by or dependency  on
landlords,  employers,  union leaders,  bureaucrats  or any other  type of denigrating  obstacle  to a
share  of legitimate  economic  gains?
Is there  freedom  from extreme  government  indifference  and corruption
3  Freedom  of the Press
Laws and Practice: Assess whether  or not  dissent  is allowed,  if private  media  are permitted
alongside  governmental  broadcastng, if independent  media,  in practice,  are permitted  to express
diverse  views
Political  Influence  over Media  Content This category  reflects  political  pressure  on the content  of
both privately  owned  and government  media,  and  takes into account  the day-to-day  conditions  in
which  journalists  work,  threats  from organized  crime,  or from religious  extremists,  for example,
often  generate  self-censorship  and so negatively  affect the media  environment
Economic  influence  over Media  Content:  Economic  influence  may come from the govemment  or
from  private entrepreneurs.  This reflects  competitive  pressures  in the private sector  that distort
reportage  as well as economic  favoritism  or reprisals  by  government  for unwanted  press
coverage
Actual Incident  of Violations  of F'ress  Freedom:  Murders,  arrests,  suspension  and other  violations
create  a sense of fear which may  discourage  objective  reporting
41Table  AAA.6.  Freedom  House  (cont.)
Nations  in Transit
4 Political  Process
Deals  with  elections,  referenda,  party  configuration,  conditions  for political  compettion,  and
popular  participation  in elections
5 Civil  Society
Highlights  the degree  to which  volunteerism,  trade  unionism,  and  professional  associations  exist,
and  whether  civic  organizations  are influential
6 Independent  Media
Press  freedom,  public  access  to a variety  of information  sources,  and  the independence  of  those
sources  from  undue  govemment  or other  influences.
7 Rule  of  Law
Considers  judicial  and  constitutional  matters  as  well  as  the legal  and  de facto  status  of ethnic
minorities.
8 Govemment  and  Public  Administration
Govemment  decentralization,  independent  and  responsibilities  or local  and  regional  govemments,
and  legislative  and  executive  transparency  are discussed.
9 Privatization
Details  legislative  and  actual  states  of  privatzation
10 Macroeconomic  Policy
Covers  tax reform,  fiscal  and  monetary  policy,  and  banking  reform
11 Microeconomic  Policy
Covers  property  rihgts,  price  liberalization;  and  the  ability  to operate  a busness,  international
trade  and  foreing  investment,  and  the  energy  sector
42A1.7  Gallup International
Gallup International  Association is a group of 49 marketing agencies around the world.
Gallup was founded in 1947 and is headquartered in Switzerland.  As of May 1999, Gallup
International can be reached at httrp://www.iallup-international.com/surveyl.html.
In 1997, Gallup Intemational celebrated  its 50th  anniversary with a survey of around
30,000 people in 44 countries. Opinions were collected on a variety of topics including
corruption in society.  For corruption, Gallup asked respondents "From the following groups of
people can you tell me for each one of them if there are a lot of cases of corruption, many, few
cases or no cases of corruption at all: 1) politicians,  2) trade unionists, 3) public officials, 4)
businessmen, 5) judges, 6) ordinary citizens, 7) clergy/priests, and 8) journalists."
We construct a country index:  of corruption in the public sphere as the average responses
regarding politicians, public officials and judges.  We assign a value of  2 to "a lot", a value of 1
to "many" and a value of 0 to "few or none". For each of these three categories, we construct a
weighted average of these three numbers using the fraction of respondents in each category.
We then construct a simple average across the three categories as the country index.
Table  A1.7  Gallup  Intemational  50th  Anniversary  Survey
From  the  followingi  groups  of  people  can  you  tell me  for
each  one  of them  if there  are a lot  of cases  of corruption,
many,  few  cases  or no  cases  of corruption  at  all:
1) politicians
2) trade  unionists
3) public  officials
4) businessmen
5)  judges
6) ordinary  citizens
7) clergy/priests
8)  journalists
43A1.8  World  Economic  Forum  (GCS,  GCSA)
The  World  Economic  Forum  (WEF)  is an independent,  not-for-profit  organization  bringing
together  top leaders  from business,  government,  academia  and the media  to address  key
economic,  social  and political  issues  in partnership.  The  WEF  was  founded  in 1971  and is
headquartered  in Geneva,  Switzerland.  As of May  1999,  the WEF can  be reached  at:
httD:l/www.weforum.org.
Since  1996,  The  WEF has  sponsored  the Global  Competitiveness  Report,  an annual
publication  produced  in collaboration  with  the Harvard  Institute  for Intemational  Development
(HIID). As background  for this report,  the WEF  conducts  a survey  of about  3000  enterprises  in
60 countries,  the Global  Competitiveness  Survey. Since  1998,  the WEF has  also sponsored  the
Africa  Competitiveness  Report,  also produced  in partnership  with HIID. As background  for this
report,  the  WEF  conducted  a survey  of 650 enterprises  in 23  African  countries,  the Global
Competitiveness  Survey  Africa.  In this paper,  we rely  on  data  from the 1998  editions  of the
Global  Competitiveness  Survey  and the Global  Competitiveness  Survey  Africa.
Global  Competitiveness  Survey (GCS)
This  survey  measures  the perceptions  of business  executives  about  the country  in which
they operate. The  survey  asks  top managers  to rank  on a 1 to 7 scale  their opinion  on several
issues  that can  not be measured  otherwise.  The survey  covers  eight broad  topics:  1)
Openness,  2) Government,  3) Finance,  4) Infrastructure,  5) Technology,  6) Management,  7)
Labor,  and 8) Institutions.
Global  Competitiveness  Survey Africa (GCSA)
The GCSA  follows  the same  methodology  as  the GCS,  although  there  are some  minor
differences  in  the questionnaires  of the two surveys.  Table  A1.8  describes  the questions  from
this survey  included  in the governance  database.
44Table A1.8 World Economic Forum
Global  Competitiveness Report
Year Number  Question
Openness
1 98  q101  Neaative  impact of tariffs  on co0ts and availabilitv  of equipment  and materials
2 98  q102  Negative  impact  of hidden  barriers  to trade
Govemment
3 98  q201  Likelihood  of dramatic  change in institutions
4 98  q204  Competence  of public sector personnel
5 98  q205  Time spent  with bureaucracv
6 98  q208  Political  pressure  on public  services
7 98  q209  The tax svstem hinders business  competitiveness
8 98  q210  Extent  of tax evasion
9 98  q211  Wasteful govemment  expenditure
Finance
10 98  q303  Domestic  banks are protected  from foreiqn  competition
11 98  q311  Barriers  to entry in banking  sector are  very hiah
12 98  q312  Interest  rates are heavilv  regulated
Infrastructure
13 98  q414  Private  sector participation  in infrastructure  proiects is not permitted
Technology
14 98  a511  Intellectual  propertv  protection
Institutions
15 98  a801  Extent  of market  comPetition
16 98  q802  Effectiveness  of anti-trust  policies
17 97  q803  Irregular,  additional payrnents  connected  with import and export permits,  business  licensees,
exchange  controls, tax assessments,  police protection  or loan applicatons
18 98  q803  Irregular,  additional payrnents  connected  with import and export permits,  business  licensees,
exchange  controls,  tax assessments,  Police  Protection  or loan applications
19 98  q805  Independence  of the judiciary from interference  by the govemment  and/or  parties to the
dispute
20 97  q806  Legal  system effectiveness  at enforcirn commercial  contracts
21 98  Q806  Leqal svstem  effectiveness  at enforcinq  commerdal  contracts
22 97  q808  Private  business  capacity  to file lawsuits  at independent  and impartial  courts against
government
23 98  q808  Compliance  with court nilings and  /or arbitration  awards
24 98  q809  Frequency  of 'irreqular  iayments"  to officials  and iudiciarv
25 97  q810  Citizens' willingness  to accept  legal means  to adjudicate  disputes  rather  than depending on
25  97  q810  physical force or illeqal means
26 98  q810  Private business  has recourse  to independent  and impartial  courts for challenging  the legality
of govemment  actions
27 98  q811  LUkelihood  of winning  a court  case filed against  the govemment
28 97  q813  The highest power  is ahNays  peacefuliv  transferred
29 98  q813  Govemment  commitments
30 98  q814  Police  effectiveness  in safeguarding  personal  security
31 98  q815  Costs  of organized  crimre  for business
45Table A1.8 World Economic  Forum (cont)
Africa Competitiveness  Report
Number Question
Institutions
32  1 (Now) Extent of market competition
33  2 Effectiveness of anti-trust policies
34  3 (Now) Legal system effectveness at enforcing commercial contracts
35  4 (Now) Private business has recourse to independent  and impartial courts for challenging the legality
of govemment actons
36  6 (Now  Private business can readily file and  try lawsuits against other business,  foreign or domestic,
) at independent  and impartial courts
37  6Citizens'  willingness to accept legal means to adjudicate disputes rather than depending on
6 physical force or illegal means
38  7 Change in Insttutons,
39  9 Costs of uncertain rules, laws, or government policies
40  10 Government honors commitments  of previous regimes
41  1  1Strength  and experbse of the civil service to avoid drastc interruptons in government services
in tmes  of politcal instabilitv
42  13 Police effectveness in safeguarding  Personal  securitv
43  14 Costs of orpanized crime for business
44  15 Costs of petty crime and theft for business
Openness
45  1 (Now) Negative impact of tariffs on costs and availability of equipment  and materials
46  2 (Now) Negative imPact of hidden barriers to trade
47  14 Openness of public sector contracts to foreign investors
48  15 Policies for dividend remittances as obstacies to development
Macroeconomics
49  1 Dominance of state owned  or state controlled enterprise
50  2 Regulatory burden
51  5 Competence  of public sector personnel,
52  4 State interference in Private  business
53  6 Regulatory discretionality (vague regulabons)
54  8 The tax svstem hinders business competitiveness
55  9 Extent of tax evasion
56  10 Wasteful govemment expenditure,
Finance
57  1 Domestic banks are protected from foreign competition -
Govemance
58  1 (Now) Irregular,  additional payments connected with import and  export permits, business licensees,
exchanoe controls, tax assessmnents,  police Protection  or loan applicatons
General questons
59  a  Regulations for starting a business as an obstacle to business  development
60  b  Price controls as an obstacle to business  development
61  c  Regulabons on foreian trade as an obstacle to business  development
62  f  Foreign  currency regulations as an obstacle to business develoPment
63  d  Transfer costs associated  with exportng capital as an obstacle to business development
64  m  General uncertainty on costs of regulabons  as an obstade to business development
65  n  Crime and theft as an obstacle to business development
66  o  Corrupton as an obstacle to business  development
67  p  Tribal conflict as an obstacle for business development
68  q  Govemment coups or politcal instabilitv as an obstacle to development
46A1.9  Heritage  Foundation/Wall  Street  Journal  (HFWSJ)
The Heritage  Foundation  is a research  and  educational  institute  whose  mission  is to
formulate  and promote  conservative  public  policies.  The Heritage  Foundation  was established
in 1973  and  is headquartered  in Washington,  DC. As of May 1999,  the Heritage  Foundation
can be reached  on  the web at hbto:_/www.heritaoe.ora.
In 1995  the Heritage  Foundation,  in partnership  with  the Wall  street  Journal,  launched  its
annual  Index  of Economic  Freedom,  This index  covers  161  countries  and measures  economic
freedoms  and prospects  for growth  in the global  economy.  The index  is designed  for cross
country  research  and to assist  international  investors  and aid donors  to allocate  their resources.
We use  data  from  the 1998  edition  of this Index.
This index  is based  on a detailed  assessment  of 10  different  factors,  including  foreign
investment  codes,  taxes,  tariffs,  banking  regulations,  monetary  policy,  and  the black  market.  For
some  of these,  assessments  are mechanically  based  on  objective  data,  while others  are
generated  as subjective  ratings  based  on a pre-specified  checklist.  These  checklists  are
completed  drawing  on  a large  number  of public  and private  sources.  The 10  factors  underlying
the 1998  Index  of Economic  Freedom  are  listed  in  Table  A1.9
47Table A1.9  Heritage Foundation  / Wall Street Journal: Index of Economic Freedom
1  Trade:
* What  is the average  tariff rate?
*  Are there  any significant  non-tariff  barriers?
* Is there corruption  in the customs  service?
2  Taxation(*)
* What  is the top income  tax rate?
What  tax rate  applies  to the average  income  level?
What  is the  top corporate  tax rate?
* What  other taxes  exist?
3  Government  Intervention
* What  is the govemment  consumption  level  as a percentage  of the economy?
* To what  extent  does the govemment  own businesses  and industries?
How  much  of the economy's  output  is produced  by  the government?
4  Monetary  Policy
* What  is the average  inflation  rate  from 1985  to 1994?
* What  is  the average  inflation  rate  for 1995?
5  Capital  Flows  and Foreian  Investment
* Does  the country  have  an investment  code?
* Does  it provide  100 percent  foreign  ownership?
Are  these  restrictions  on which  industries  and companies  foraign  investors  can invest  in?
*  Are  these  restrictions  and performance  requirements  on foreign  companies?
*  Can  foreigners  own  land?
Are  foreign  and domestic  companies  treated  the same  under  the law?
* Does  the country  allow  foreign  companies  to repatriate  their  earnings?
* Can  foreign  companies  receive  local  financing?
6  Banking
* Does  the govemment  own  any banks?
* Can  foreign  banks  open  branches  and  subsidiaries?
* Does  the govemment  influence  the allocation  of credit?
* Are  banks  free  to operate  without  govemment  reaulations  such  as deposit  insurance?
* Are  banks  free  to offer  all types  of  financial  services  like buying  and seUling  real estate,  securities  and
insurance  policies?
7  Wage  and Price  Controls
* Does  the aovemment  have  a minimum  waqe?
*  Are businesses  free  to set  their  own  prices  without  govemment  influence?
Does  the govemment  set  prices  for any products?
If so.  to what  extent?
* Does  the govemment  provide  subsidies  to businesses  to affect  prices?
8 Property  Rights
* Is the legal  system  free  from govemment  influence
* Is there  a commercial  code  defining  contracts?
* Does  the country  allow  foreign  arbitration  of contract  disputes?
Can  property  be expropriated  by  the government?
Is there  corrupton  within  the iudiciary?
Are  there maior  delays  in receiving  judicial  decisions?
Is private  property  legally  granted  and protected?
9  Regulabtion
* Is a license  reouired  to operate  a business?
* Is it easy  to obtain  a business  license?
Is there  corruption  within  the bureaucracy?
* Does  the govemment  force  businesses  to subscribe  to strict  established  work  weeks,  paid vacabons,
matemity  leaves,  etc.?
* Does  the govemment  force  businesses  to subscribe  to stnict  environmental,  consumer  safety,  and
worker  health  regulabons?
* Does  the existence  of regulations  pose a burden  on business?  To what  extent?
10 Black  Market
Is there  a significant  level  of a country's  labor  supplied  on  the black  market?
Is there  a sionificant  level  of a country's  transportation  supplied  on the black  market?
Is there  a significant  level  of a country's  agricultural  production  supplied  on the black  market?
Is there  a significant  level  of a country's  manufacturing  supplied  on  the black  market?
- Is there  a significant  level  of a country's  services  supplied  on the black  market?
* Is there  a significant  level  of piracy  of intellectual  property  in the black  market?
Is there  a significant  level  of smuggling  in the country?
(-) The  taxation  index is itself  the average  of two  sub-indices,  one on income  taxes  and another  one on
corporate  taxes.
48A1.10  Political  Risk Services  (PRS)
The PRS group is an affiliate of Investment Business with Knowledge (IBC), a United
States-based corporation providing up-to-date country information  for international business.
PRS was founded in 1980 and is headquartered in Syracuse, New York.  As of May 1999  can
be reached at http:l/www.prsgroup.  com.
Since 1982, PRS produces the International  Country Risk Guide  (ICRG) which provides
assessments of a political, economic and financial risks is a large number of developed and
developing countries. These assessments  are based on the analysis of a worldwide network of
experts, and is subject to a peer review process at subject and regional levels to ensure the
coherence and comparability across countries.  In this paper we use data from the 1998 edition
of the Intemational Country Risk Guide.
The ICRG assesses three mnajor  categories of risk: political (with 12 components),
financial (5 components) and economic (6 components). We use components of the Political
Risk Index, which report subjective assessments  of the-factors influencing the business
environment in a particular country. Table Al.10  presents the different components of the
political risk ratings.
49Table A1.10 Intemational Country Risk Guide: Political Risk Components
1 Govemment  Stability
Measures  the government's  ability  to carry out its declared  programs,  and its ability  to stay in office. This will
depend  on issues  such as: the type of govemance,  the cohesion  of  the govemment  and governing  party or
parties,  the closeness  of the next election,  the govemment's  command  of the legislature,  and popular  approval  of
the govemment  policies.
2 Socioeconomic  Conditions
Quantifies  general  public satisfaction  with the government's  economic  policies. A range  of factors, such as
infant  mortality,  medical  provision  of housing  or interest  rates, enter into this  category  according  to how  important
they are  for each particular  country.
3 Investment  Profile
Includes  the risk  to operations  (scored  from 0 to 4, increasing  in risk); taxation  (scored  from 0 to 3), repatriation
(scored  from 0 to 3); repatriation  (scored  from 0 to 3) and labor costs  (scored  from 0 to 2). They all look at the
qovemment's  attitude  towards investment.
4 Intemal  Conflict
Assess political  violence  and its influence  on govemance. Highest  scores  go to countries  with no armed
opposition,  and where  the govemment  does not indulge  in arbitrary  violence,  direct or indirect. Lowest ratings  go
to civil war tom countries. Intermediate  ratings  are awarded  on the basis of  the threats  to the govemment  and
business:  whether  the acts  of violence have a political  objective  or not, whether  violent  groups represent  a
sizeable  minority  or not, how  well organized  these  groups  are  and how  much  popular  support  they receive,  how
frequent  the act of violence are,  and whether  they are  geographically  limited  or not.
5 Extemal  Conflict
Rates  both  the risk  for the govemment  and for foreign  investment. Measures  may consist of trade restrictions,
embargoes,  geopolitical  disputes,  armed  threats,  border disputes,  foreign  supported  insurgencies,  and full scale
warfare.
6 Corruption
Measures  corruption  within  the political  system,  which distorts  the economic  and financial environment,  reduces
the efficiency  of govemment  and business  by  enabling  people  to assume  positions  of power  through patronage
rather  than ability,  and introduces  an inherently  instability  in the political  system. The most common  form of
corruption  met direcly by business  is financial  corruption  in the form of demands  for bribes connected  with
import and export licenses,  exchange  controls,  tax assessments,  police  protection  or loans. This measure  is
also concemed  with actual or potential  corruption  in the form of patronage,  nepotism,  job reservabon,  ifavor-for-
favor, secret party  funding,  and suspiciously  dose ties between  politics  and business. The major risk arising
from corruption  is that a major political  scandal  produces  a popular  backlash  resulting  in a fall or overthrow  of the
govemment,  a major  reorganizing  or restructuring  of the country's  political  institution,  or at worst a breakdown  in
taw  and order,  rendering  the country  ungovemable. One possible  leading  indicator  for political  corruption  is the
7 Military  in Politics
The military are  not elected  by  anyone,  so their  participation  in govemment,  either  direct or indirect, reduces
accountability  and therefore  represents  a risk. The  threat of military  intervention  might lead as well to an
antcipated potentially  inefficient  change  in policy  or even in govemment. It  also works as an indication  that the
govemment  is unable  to function  effectively  and that the country  has an uneasy  environment  for foreign
business.
8 Religion  in Politics
Religious  tensions  may stem from the domination  of society  and/or  govemance  by a single  religious  group  that
seeks  to replace  civil law by religious  law and to exclude  other religions  from the political  andlor social process.
The risk  involved here range  from inexperience3d  people  imposing  inappropriate  policies  though civil dissent to
civil war.
9 Law and Order
The Law  sub-component  is an assessment  of the strength  and impartiality  of the legal system,  while  the Order
sub-component  is an assessment  of popular  observance  of  the law (they  are assessed  separately).
10 Ethnic  Tensions
Measures  tensions  attributable  to racial, nationality,  or language  divisions,  gauging  how intolerant,  unwilling  to
compromise  the different  groups  might  be.
11 Democratic  Accountability
Quantifies  how responsive  govemment  is to its people,  on the basis  that the less response  there is the more
likely is that the govemment  will fall, peacefully  or violently. It includes  not only  if free and fair elections  are in
place, but also how likely  is the govemment  to remain  in power  or remain  popular.
12 Bureaucratic  Quality
Measures  institutonal strength  and quality  of the civil service,  assess  how much  strength  and expertse
bureaucrats  have and how able they are to manage  political  altemations  without drastic  interruptions  in
govemment  services,  or policy  changes. Good performers  have somewhat  autonomous  bureaucracies,  free
from political  pressures,  and an established  mechanism  for recruitment  and training.
50A1.1  1 Political Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC)
The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy  specializing in strategic information and
analysis for companies doing business in the countries in East and Southeast Asia.  PERC  was
founded in 1976 and is headquartered in Hong Kong.  As of May 1999, PERC can be reached
at http:l/www.asiarisk.com/perc.htr  il.
PERC has conducted three surveys of expatriate business managers in the East Asia
region.  The results of these surveys were published under the tiles "Corruption in Asia in 1998"
(from Asian Intelligence Issue #507'  April 1, 1998),  'Transparency  Problems In Asia" (from Asian
Intelligence Issue  #498, November 19, 1997),  and  "Shortcomings of the Media in Asia"
([PUBLICATION INFO]). Based on the average responses in these surveys, PERC has
produced country ratings.  In this paper, we use data from each of these three surveys.
Corruption in Asia in 1998
In this survey, foreign managers working within the East Asia region were questioned
about their perception of corruption, the quality of the legal system, and the professionalism
and reliability of the police and judiciary. We have obtained their data on corruption for 12
countries, based on a total of 427 responses. With respect to corruption, respondents were
asked "To what extent does corruption exist in a way that detracts from the business
environment for foreign companies?".
Transparency Problems in Asia
In this survey, foreign managers in the East Asia region were asked about their
perceptions of transparency in the business environment.  A precise definition of transparency
was not provided to respondents.
Quality of the Media
In this survey, businessmen (including  foreign and local mangers) in the East Asia
region were asked their perceptions regarding the degree of censorship practiced, the quality of
local media, access to foreign print media, and access to foreign broadcast media.
Table A1.1  1 Political Economic Risk Consultancy
1 Corruption
2 Transparency
3 Quality of the Media
Degree of censorship practiced
Quality of local media
Access to foreign print media
Access to foreign broadcast media
51A1.12  Institute  for Management  Development  (WCY)
The Institute  for Management  Development  is an research  and educational  organization
based  in Lausanne,  Switzerland.  As of May  1999, it can  be reached  at http:Ilwww.imd.ch.
The Institute  for Management  Development  has  published  the World  Competitiveness
Yearbook  since 1987. Until 1996,  this was  a joint effort  with  the World  Economic  Forum. We
use  data  from  the 1998  edition  of the World  Competitiveness  Yearbook.
The  World  Competitiveness  Yearbook  analyzes  the competitive  environment  in 47
countries. It is based  on both  objective  data  and  surveys  of perceptions.  The survey  questions
over  4,000  local  and  foreign  enterprises  operating  in the countries  under  analysis. Mean  scores
on the survey  questions  are  reported  in the yearbook  for all countries. In Table  A1.12  we list  the
questions  included  in the governance  database.
Table  A1.12  World  Competitiveness  Survey
Number Question
Domestic  economy
1 y108  The  parallel  economy  as  an  obstacle  to business  development
Internationalization
2 y230  Protectionism  as an  obstacle  to imports  from  abroad
3 y231  Controls  on  foreign  investors  ownership  of companies
4 y232  Obstacles  to foreign  bidders  on  public  contracts
Government
5 y316  Real  personal  taxes  as  a burden  to  work  initiative
6 y320  Improper  practices  in  the  public  sphere
7 y321  Real  corporate  taxes  as a burden  to entrepreneurial  activity
8 y324  Extent  of  tax  evasion
9 y326  Legal  framework  as  an  obstacle  to compettiveness
10 y328  Transparency:  The  government  communicates  its  intentions  successfully
11 y329  Political  system  as  an  obstacle  to development
12 y330  Exposure  of public  service  to political  interference
13 y331  Bureaucracy  as  an  obstacle  to business  development
14 y332  Effective  implementation  of  govemment  decisions
15 y333  Custom's  administration  as  a burden  to intemabonal  trade
16 y336  Price  controls
17 y340  Competition  laws  as an  obstacle  to fair  competiton
18 y341  Confidence  in  the  fair  administration  of  justice  in  the  society
19 y343  Confidence  among  people  that  their  person  and  property  is protected
Finance
20 y420  Legal  Regulation  of Financial  Institutions
Science
21 y720  Protection  of intellectual  property
52A1.13  World Bank/University of E3asel  (WDR)
The World Bank is an internal:ional  organization  dedicated to eradicating poverty in the
world.  It was founded in 1945 and is located in Washington. As of  May 1999, the World Bank
can be reached at httPJl/www.worldbank.orq.
As background for the 1997 VVorld  Development Report (WDR) on the role of the state,
the World Bank conducted a survey of approximately  3000 enterprises on 69 countries. This
survey was designed to measure the perception  of firms on the constraints that government
actions impose on them. The results of this survey are in the public domain and may be
downloaded from http:l/www.worldbank.orp/html/edi/gac/  ubs.htm.
In a separate effort, the same questionnaire was implemented by Aymo Brunetti and
Beatrice Weder of the University  of Basel, in five additional countries. Data and information on
this research project can be found at: http://www.unibas.chlwwz/wifor/survev
In the governance database,  we combine information from these two sources and use the
country average responses to the questions listed in Table Al .13.
Appendix 2: Components of Aggiregate  Governance Indicators
Table Gl. Voice and  Accountability
Code  Table  Row  Concepts  measured
(Appendix  1)
Representative  sources
EIU  A 1.5  3  Change  in government,  orderly  transfer
9  Legal  system,  transparency,  fairness
FH  A 1.6  2  Civil Liberties:  Freedom  of speech,  of assembly  and
demonstration,  of religion,  equal opportunity,  of
of excessive  governmental  intervention
1  Political  Rights:  free and  fair elections,  representative  legislative,
free vote, political parties,  no dominant  group,
respect  for minorities
3  Free Press:  Laws and practice,  independence,  and violations)
PRS  A 1.10  7  Military  in politics: Reduces  accountability
11  Democratic  accountability:  Responsiveness  of the government  to
its people,  free and  fair elections
WDR  A 1.13  3  Business  is kept informed  of important  developments  in
rules and policies
4  Business  has a voice to express  its concems over
changes  in laws or policies
Non-representative  sources
FHNT  A 1.6  4  Political  process: Elections,  party configuration,  political competition,
and participation
5  Civil society:  Volunteerism,  trade unionism,  professional
associations.
6  Independent  media
PERC  Media: independence  and quality
Transparency  of the business  environment
WCY98  A 1.12  10  Transparency:  The government  communicates  its
intentions  successfullyTable G2. Political  Instability  and Violence
Code  (Appe  ndix1)  Row  Concepts measured
Representative  sources
DRI  A 1.3  Risks reduction of GDP by 1-4% due to:
24  Major Urban Riot
20  Major insurgency/rebellion
19  Military coup
21  Political terrorism
22  Political assassination
23  Civil war
EIU  A 1.5  1  Armed conflict, war
2  Social unrest
4  Terrorist threat, political violence
PRS  A 1.10  4  Intemal Conflict: Political violence and govemance, from no
tolerance of arbitrary violence to civil war tom
countries (from best to worse score)
10  Ethnic tensions:  Based on intolerance and prone to conflict
WDR  A 1.13  15  Terrorism as an obstacle  to business development
5  Likelihood  of unconstitutional govemment changes
Non-representative  sources
BERI  A 1.1  1  Fractionalization  of the political spectrum
3  Fractionalization  by ethnic, language and religious groups
5  Restrictive (coercive) measures to retain power
6  Organization/power of radical group
9  Societal conflict: Strikes, Violence, Demonstrations
10  Constitutional Changes, Assassinations, Guerrillas
CEER  A 1.2  19  Political stability
GCS97  A 1.8
GCS98  3  Likelihood of dramatic change in institutions
28  The highest power is always peacefully transferred
GCSA  A 1.8  3  Likelihood of dramatic changes in institutions
68  Government coups or political instability as an obstacle to
development
67  Tribal conflict as an obstacle for business development
54Table  G3. Govemment Effectivenoss
Code  Table  Row  Concepts measured
(Appendix 1)
Representative  sources
EIU  A 1.5  6  Govemment  policy  (pro-business)
7  Govemment/Institutional  efficacy
8  Red  tape  / bureaucracy
DRI  A 1.3  29  Institutional  failure:  Institutional  rigidities  that hinder
bureaucratic  efficiency
28  Govemment  ineffectiveness:  Quality  of the  govemment's
personnel
27  Govemment  instability: High  tumoverthat lowers  the quality
of the  govemments  personnel
PRS  A 1.10  1  Govemment  stability: Its ability  to carry  out programs
12  Bureaucratic  quality: Civil service's  institutional  strength,  free
from  political  influences
WDR  A 1.13  18  Likelihood  that when  a govemment  official  acts against  the rules,
one can  go to another  official  or a superior  and get
correct  treatment
19  Management  tme spent  with bureaucrats
20  The efficiency  customs
21  The general  condition  of roads  you  use
22  The  efficiency  of mail  delivery
23  The quality  of public  health  care  provision
24  Govemment  efficiency  in delivering  services
1  Predictability  of changes  in rules  and laws
2  Credibility  of govemment's  commitment  to policies
Non-representative  sources
BERI  A 1.1  21  Bureaucratic  delays
FHNT  A 1.6  8  Govemment  and administration:  Decentralization  and  transparency
GCS98  A 1.8  4  Competence  of public  sector  personnel  relative  to private  sector
9  Wasteful  govemment  expenditure
29  Govemment  commitments  are honored  by new  govemments
5  Management  time  spent with  bureaucracy
6  Public  service  vulnerability  to political  pressure
GCSA  A 1.8  4  Competence  of public  sector  personnel  relative  to private  sector
9  Wasteful  govemment  expenditure
29  Govemment  commitments  are honored  by new govemments
41  Strength  and expertise  of the civil service  to avoid drastic
interruptions  in govemment  services  in times  of
political  instability
WCY98  A 1.12  14  Effective  implementation  of govermment  decisions
13  Bureaucracy  as an obstacle  to business  development
12  Exposure  of public  service  to political  interference
55Table G4. Regulatory Burden
Code  Table  Row  Concepts measured
(Appendix 1)
Representative  sources
HFWSJ  A 1.9  9  Regulation  (regulations  that impose  a burden  on business)
3  Govemment  interventon  in economy
7  WagePrice  control
5  Trade  policy  (tariff  and no-tariff  barriers  to trade)
Capital  flows  and  foreign  investment  (financial  regulations
for foreigners)
6  Banking  (free  from  govemment  intervention,  financial
regulations  domestic)
DRI  A 1.3  13  Export  regulations
14  Import  regulations
15  Other  regulations  (regulatory  burden)
10  Legal  restrictions  on ownership  of business  by non-residents
11  Legal  restrictions  on ownership  of equity  by non-residents
WDR  A 1.13  9  Regulations  of starting  new  business  as an obstacle  to
business  development
10  Price  controls  as an obstacle  to business  development
11  Regulations  on foreign  trade  as obstacle  for business  development
12  Foreign  currency  regulations  as obstacle  for business  development
13  General  uncertainty  about  the of costs of regulations  as an
obstacle  to business  development
Non-representative  sources
EBRD8  A 1.4  4  Price  liberalization
5  Trade  regulations
Competition  policy
8  Banking:  Extensiveness  of legal rules
9  Banking:  Effectiveness  of legal regulations
8  Securities:  Extensiveness  of legal  rules
9  Securibes:  Effectiveness  of legal  regulations
GCS98  A 1.8  10  Protection  of domestic  banks  from foreign  competition
11  Barriers  to entry in banking  sector
12  Interest  rates  are heavily  regulated
1  Participation  of private  sector  in infrastructure  projects
15  Extent  of market  competition
16  Effectiveness  of anti-trust  policies
I  Negative  impact  of tariffs  on costs and availability  of equipment
and materials
2  Negative  impact  of hidden  barriers  to trade
7  The  tax system  hinders  business  competitiveness
56Table G4. Regulatory Burden (cont)
Code  Table  Row  Concepts measured
(Appendix  1)
Non-representative sources (cont)
GCSA  A 1.8  15  Extent  of market  competition
16  Effectiveness  of anti-trust policies
39  Costs  of uncertain  rules,  laws, or govemment policies
1  Negative  impact  of tariffs on costs  and availability of
equipment  and materials
2  Negative  impact  of hidden  barriers to trade
47  Openness  of public  sector contracts  to foreign  investors
48  Policies  for dividend  remittances  as obstacles to development
49  Dominance  of state owned or state controlled  enterprises
50  Regulatory  burden
52  State interference  in private business
53  Regulatory  discretionality  (vagueness of regulations)
54  The tax system hinders business  competitiveness
57  Protection  of domestic banks from foreign competition
59  Regulations  for starting a business  as an obstacle  to
business  development
60  Price controls as an obstacle to business  development
61  Regulations  on foreign trade as an obstacle  to business
development
62  Foreign currency  regulations  as an obstacle  to business
development
63  Transfer  costs associated  with exporting capital as an
obstacle  to business  development
64  General  uncertainty  on costs of regulations as an obstacle to
business  development
WCY98  A 1.12  20  Legal  regulation  of financial institutions
2  Protectionism  as an obstacle  to imports from abroad
3  Controls  on foreign investors  ownership  of companies
4  Obstacles  to foreign bidders on public contracts
11  Political  system as an obstacle  to development
5  Real  personal  taxes as a burden  to work initiative
7  Real  corporate  taxes as a burden  to entrepreneurial  activity
9  Legal  framework as an obstacle  to competitiveness
15  Custom's  administration  as a burden  to intemational trade
16  Price controls
17  Competition  laws as an obstacle  to fair competition
57Table  G5. Rule  of Law
Code  Table  Row  Concepts  measured
(Appendix  1)
Representative  sources
DRI  A 1.3  18  Losses  and  Costs  of Crime
26  Kidnapping  of Foreigners
9  Enforceability  of private  contracts
8  Enforceability  of  govemment  contracts
EIU  A 1.5  10  Corruption  in banking
11  Crime
HFWSJ  A 1.9  10  Black  Market
8  Property  Rights
PRS  A 1.10  9  Law  and  order  tradition
WDR  A 1.13  6  Theft  and  crime  (now)
7  Confidence  in authority  to  secure  property  (now)
8  Unpredictability  of the  judiciary  (now)
14  Crime  and theft  as obstacles  to business
Non-representative  sources
BERI  A 1.1  12  Enforceability  of contracts
CEER  A 1.2  6  Rule  of  Law
FHNT  A 1.6  7  Ruleoflaw
GCS98  A 1.8
GCS97  8  Extent  of  tax evasion
31  Costs  of organized  crime  for  business
30  Police  effectiveness  in safeguarding  personal  security
14  Intellectual  property  protection
23  Compliance  with court  rulings  and  /or arbitration  awards
20  Legal  system  effectiveness  at enforcing  commercial
19  Independence  of  the  judiciary  from  interference  by  the
govemment  and/or  parties  to the  dispute
26  Private  business  has  recourse  to independent  and  impartial
courts  for challenging  the legality  of  govemment  actions
27  Likelihood  of winning  a court  case  filed  against  the  govemment
20  Legal  system  effectiveness  at enforcing  commercial  contracts
22  Private  business  capacity  to file  lawsuits  at independent
and  impartial  courts  against  govemment
25  Citizens'  willingness  to accept  legal  means  to adjudicate
disputes  rather  than  depending  on physical  force
or illegal  means
58Table G5.  Rule of Law (cont.)
Code  Table  Row  Concepts measured
(Appendix 1)
Non-representative  sources (cont.)
GCSA  A 1.8  20  Legal system effectiveness  at enforcing commercial  contracts
26  Private business  has recourse  to independent  and impartial
courts for challenging  the legality of
government  actions
36  Private business  can readily  file and try lawsuits against other
business,  foreign or domestic,  at independent
and impartial courts
25  Citizens' willingness  to accept legal means to adjudicate
disputes rather  than depending  on physical
force or illegal means
31  Costs of organized  crime for business
44  Costs of petty crime and theft for business
30  Police  effectiveness  in safeguarding  personal security
8  Extent  of tax evasion
65  Crime and theft as an obstacle to business development
WCY98  A 1.12  1  The parallel economy  as an obstacle  to business  development
8  Extent of tax evasion
18  Confidence  in the fair administration  of justice in the society
19  Confidence  among people that their person and property
is protected
21  Protection  of intellectual  property
59Table G6. Graft
Code  Table  Row  Concepts  measured
(Appendix 1)
Representative  sources
DRI  A 1.3  Corruption  among  public  officials,  effectiveness  of
anticorrupton  initiatives
EIU  A 1.5  10  Corruption  among  public  officials
PRS  A 1.10  6  Corruption  in the  political  system  as a "threat  to
foreign  investment'
WDR  A 1.13  17  Frequency  of "additional  payments"  to "get  things  done"
15  Corrupton  as  "g@o4wgI  tg minif@§s"
Non-representative  sources
BERI  A 1.1  2  Mentality  regarding  corrupbon
CEER  A 1.2  Effect  of corruption  on "attractiveness  of country  as
a place  to  do business"
FHNT  A 1.6  Perceptions  of corruption  in civil  service,  business
interests  of policymakers
GALLUP  Frequency  of "cases  of corruption"  among  public  officials
GCS98
GCS97  A 1.8  17  Irregular,  additional  payments  connected  with import
and export  permits,  business  licenses,  exchange
controls,  tax assessments,  police  protection  or
loan applications  (GCS98  and GCS97  for 5
additional  counties)
24  Frequency  of  "irregular  payments"  to  officials and  judiciary
GCSA  A 1.8  17  Irregular,  additional  payments  connected  with import  and
export  permits,  business  licenses,  exchange
controls,  tax assessments,  police  protection  or
loan  applicatons
66  Corruption  as an obstacle  to business  development
PERC  Effect  of corrupbon  on business  environment  for  foreign  companies
WCY98  A 1.12  6  ImDroDer  Dractices  in the oublic  sDherp
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